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INTRODUCTION
Most sellers of goods or services are not legally compelled to
provide particular information about their products to potential
buyers; they must merely avoid making false claims. One impor-
tant exception relates to securities. Firms that issue securities in
the public markets must provide affirmative disclosures about
the securities and the issuer. This is true not only in the United
States, but in most developed countries. What accounts for the
distinction between securities and other products?
Surprisingly few attempts have been made to justify the
distinction on efficiency grounds. The initial approach of academ-
ic economists to the United States securities laws was to marshal
empirical evidence that investors were, or were not, better off
after the enactment of these laws.' In response to the empirical
debate, a small but influential theoretical literature has devel-
oped on the efficiency of mandatory disclosure.2 That literature
identifies the goal of mandatory disclosure as helping market
participants to determine prices for securities that accurately
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank Barry
Adler, Mike Dooley, Jill Fisch, Reinier Kraakman, Ed Kitch, Julia Mahoney, Eric Orts,
Steve Thel, George Triantis, Bill Williams, and workshop participants at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Toronto Faculty of Law for comments.
Andrew Brownstein and Jennifer Mink provided excellent research assistance.
' See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J Bus 117
(1964) (arguing that returns to investors in new issues were unaffected by securities
laws); Irwin Friend and Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J Bus
382 (1964) (challenging Stigler's analysis and countering that the variance of returns was
lower post-1933); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am Econ Rev 132 (Pt 1 1973)
(evidence suggests that mandatory periodic disclosure does not benefit investors); Irwin
Friend and Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment,
65 Am Econ Rev 467 (Pt 1 1973) (challenging Benston's analysis).
The principal works are John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va L Rev 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook and
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669
(1984); and Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for
New Security Issues, 24 J L & Econ 613 (1981).
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reflect all available information.3 Disclosure can contribute to
informational efficiency (and ultimately to social welfare) by
enabling traders to gather information, and thereby reflect new
information in prices, at a reduced cost compared to a world
without disclosure. This "accuracy enhancement" model has no
competitors as an efficiency justification of disclosure. Critics of
mandatory disclosure do not challenge the premise that the objec-
tive is to improve informational efficiency, but rather question
whether the United States securities laws have achieved that
objective.4
This Article presents an alternative efficiency justification for
mandatory disclosure in securities markets. The alternative,
which I call the "agency cost model," contends that the principal
purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors,
and between corporate managers and shareholders. Disclosure
can help reduce the cost of monitoring promoters' and managers'
use of corporate assets for self-interested purposes. The modern
literature on the firm recognizes the ubiquity and importance of
such agency problems;5 moreover, rules mandating particular
disclosures are common in principal-agent contexts.' It therefore
seems reasonable to consider the reduction of agency costs as an
efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure in securities mar-
kets.
' In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and
the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 Duke L J 977, 979 (1992); Jeffrey N.
Gordon and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 NYU L Rev 761, 802 (1985); and Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va L Rev 549, 601 (1984).
" See, for example, Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in
Search of a Purpose (Law & Business, 1979); Benston, 63 Am Econ Rev at 133-34 (cited in
note 1). Edmund Kitch challenges the notion that accuracy enhancement provides a
coherent means of analyzing mandatory disclosure, but does not suggest an alternative
model. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure (working
paper on file with U Chi L Rev).
' See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers, 76 Am Econ Rev 323 (Pt 2 1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost
Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am Econ Rev 650 (Pt 1 1984); Michael C. Jensen and
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm.- Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976).
6 See, for example, Moore & Co. v T-A-L-L, Inc., 792 P2d 794, 798-99 (Colo 1990)
(real estate broker's obligation to disclose offer to principal); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 381 (1958) ("Restatement of Agency") (agent's duty to give principal information
relevant to affairs entrusted to agent); id § 382 (duty to keep and render accounts). See
also sources cited in note 11 (duty to disclose adverse interests).
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While reduction of agency costs may be a good reason to
have mandatory disclosure, does it explain the mandatory disclo-
sure system we have? If we look only at the statutes enacted by
Congress in the 1930s, the agency cost explanation seems superi-
or to the accuracy enhancement explanation. Mandatory disclo-
sure was not a New Deal innovation, but evolved from the com-
mon law rules applicable to agents dealing adversely with their
principals. These rules were adapted to securities markets as a
means of dealing with a specific agency problem that I call the
"promoter problem." The defining characteristic of the promoter
problem was the use of the funds raised in connection with the
creation and public flotation of a new company to purchase prop-
erty or services from the company's promoter on terms that did
not reflect arm's-length bargaining. The promoter problem led
directly to the first mandatory disclosure statutes in England and
was a significant part of the background of the United States
securities laws, which borrowed heavily from the English stat-
utes. The lists of disclosable items contained in the English and
American statutes focused on the promoter problem and related
agency problems. The history and initial design of these statutes,
then, are consistent with the agency cost model.
The picture becomes more complicated when we focus on the
present. The United States securities laws give the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") the authority to alter the
details of the disclosure system.7 It has done so in ways that
diverge from the agency cost model and increasingly favor the
accuracy enhancement model. The agency cost model is not,
therefore, a convincing positive explanation for the present set of
disclosure regulations contained in the SEC's rules and forms.
Neither, however, is the accuracy enhancement model. The man-
datory disclosure system as it now exists is the product of sixty
years of shifting theoretical approaches and consequently does
not reflect any one approach. I argue, however, that the shift to-
ward accuracy enhancement has been normatively undesirable.
Mandatory disclosure is most likely to be efficient when limited
to the agency problems that spurred its creation.
The question whether mandatory disclosure serves, or should
serve, primarily to resolve a set of agency problems or to improve
informational efficiency is important because the two models
have significantly different implications for disclosure policy.
Acceptance of the accuracy enhancement model implies that
See text accompanying notes 172-73.
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information about the future is more important than information
about the past, because information about the past is already
reflected in prices. The disclosure system should therefore require
managers of firms to discuss their beliefs about the future of the
business, and should favor accounting statements that provide
current values over those that reflect the historical cost of a
company's assets.8 To the extent a company is widely followed by
securities analysts, the need for each individual investor to ob-
tain the historical data that the analysts have caused to be
reflected in prices is reduced.
In recent years, the SEC has refined the mandatory disclo-
sure system in ways that are consistent with these normative
prescriptions. It has, for example, taken tentative steps toward
incorporating forward-looking statements into disclosure docu-
ments; influenced the development of accounting standards that
require reporting or disclosure of the current values of certain
assets; and permitted larger, more widely followed companies to
use less restrictive procedures for registering securities The
desirability of these changes depends in part on the validity of
the accuracy enhancement model.
The normative prescriptions of the agency cost model tend to
point in the opposite direction of those derived from the accuracy
enhancement model. The agency cost model justifies the tradi-
tional, backward-looking model of mandatory disclosure as a
means of helping investors uncover breaches of contractual or
fiduciary obligations. Management's projections or views about
the future of the business are not likely to contain information
relevant to such breaches, and so the decision whether to disclose
can be safely left unregulated. Accounting statements will identi-
fy how the firm's money and assets are being used, allowing
investors to spot breaches of management's duties to the share-
holders. For that purpose, employing historical cost is appropri-
ate. The agency cost model, unlike the accuracy enhancement
model, argues for a mandatory disclosure system that is more
focused and more limited than the present one.
Part I of this Article identifies the specific agency problems
that can be effectively addressed by mandatory disclosure, partic-
S See Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure at 96-114, 179-198 (cited in note 4);
George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Re-
quirements, in Henry G. Manne, ed, Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate
Securities 23, 27-30 (American Enterprise Institute, 1969).
' See Part V.
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ularly the promoter problem. Part II demonstrates how the pro-
moter problem led to the development of mandatory disclosure
rules in England, first by judges and later by Parliament. Part
IlI traces the related history in the United States. Part IV argues
that to the extent the United States securities laws codified and
refined preexisting judicial solutions to the promoter problem and
related agency problems, they were probably efficient. To the
extent they authorized the expansion of the disclosure system to
pursue the accuracy enhancement goal, however, they were prob-
ably inefficient. Part V discusses the implications of the agency
cost model for present-day disclosure policy on matters such as
disclosure of projections, the use of current value accounting,
shelf registration, and executive compensation disclosure.
I. THE AGENCY COST MODEL: A DESCRIPTION AND
SOME TAXONOMY
A corporate firm is "a web of agency relationships."0 Disclo-
sure of conflicting interests is a staple of agency law." Perhaps,
then, mandatory disclosure serves to reduce agency losses that
arise because of the conflicting interests of promoters, directors,
and managers, on the one hand, and investors on the other.
It is clear that part of the purpose of mandatory disclosure is
to address some standard agency problems. In the United States,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")' requires
that all publicly traded companies make periodic disclosures,
including detailed information about management's compensation
and significant transactions between managers and the compa-
ny 3 The evident purpose of such disclosures is to help the
shareholders monitor management's self-interested behavior. By
reducing monitoring costs, disclosure reduces overall agency losses.'4
10 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
Yale L J 698, 700 (1982).
H See Construction Techniques, Inc. v Dominske, 928 F2d 632, 636 (4th Cir 1991)
(employee's duty to disclose ownership interest in employer's major supplier); Restate-
ment of Agency §§ 389, 391 (cited in note 6) (duties of agent not to deal with principal as
adverse party or act on behalf of adverse party, respectively, without disclosure to and
consent of principal).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 291, 48 Stat 881, codified at 15 USC §§
78a-7811 (1988 & Supp 1993).
" See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b)(1)(D)-(G), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(D)-(G).
1 Jensen and Meckling define agency costs to be the sum of monitoring expenditures
by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent, and residual losses not prevented by
either monitoring or bonding. See Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 308 (cited in note
5). By reducing shareholders' monitoring expenses, therefore, disclosure reduces the total
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But the most extensive mandatory disclosures are required
at the time a company sells a new issue of securities to the pub-
lic. The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")'5 requires that
companies issuing securities to the public file with the SEC a
detailed registration statement and provide extensive information
in the prospectus provided to investors. 6 The traditional expla-
nation for these disclosures is that they provide the investor with
all the "material facts" necessary to judge the value of the offered
securities. 7 Lurking beneath the surface, however, is an agency
problem to which many of the disclosures are directly relevant.
The agency problem is most substantial as well as most
easily observed in the context of a newly formed company selling
shares to the public for the first time-the situation with which
early mandatory disclosure statutes were principally con-
cerned. 8 The "promoter" typically identifies the asset or busi-
ness to be incorporated, creates the corporation, and chooses an
initial board of directors.' 9 The company, acting through its di-
rectors, purchases the assets it will use in its business, paying ei-
ther with its stock or with cash raised from investors solicited by
or on behalf of the promoter.
The company's creation and public flotation generates many
profit-making opportunities. The cash raised by the sale of stock
may be used to purchase a new business and to enter into a
variety of long-term contractual relationships. The corporation
may expend funds to hire advisors and consultants, pay commis-
sions, and purchase other goods and services. The investors who
provide the cash expect the company's board of directors to make
sure that these transactions take place on the most favorable
terms available to the company. Unfortunately, the directors are
agency cost associated with the corporate form.
1 Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 22, 48 Stat 74, codified at 15 USC §§ 77a-77z
(1988 & Supp 1993).
" Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 7, 10, 15 USC §§ 77e, 77g, 77j.
" See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 195 (1976); Croy v Campbell, 624 F2d
709, 712 (5th Cir 1980).
18 See Part II.
19 There is no universally accepted definition of the term "promoter," but the term is
generally understood to mean a person who takes the necessary steps to form a company
and to undertake the preliminary negotiations by which the company identifies a business
or asset that it will ultimately acquire. See generally L.C.B. Gower, Principles of Modern
Company Law 296-97 (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed 1992). Under Delaware law, the person
who files the certificate of incorporation, which commences the corporation's legal exis-
tence, is called the "incorporator" and has the authority prior to selection of directors to
manage the affairs of the corporation, to adopt by-laws, and to elect directors. See 8 Del
Code Ann § 107 (1991).
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chosen by the promoter and may be insufficiently independent to
champion the shareholders' interests over those of the promoter.
The promoter may wish to channel the profit-making opportuni-
ties identified above to himself or to his family, friends, and busi-
ness associates. Because the promoter can arrange for all of these
transactions prior to the company's creation, and then can choose
a board of directors to complete the transactions on behalf of the
company, the incoming shareholders may discover that the insti-
tutional features designed to protect their interests do not func-
tion properly.2"
The result is the "promoter problem"-that is, the promoter
may be able to sell property and services to the company without
any arm's-length bargaining or independent scrutiny. The prob-
lem is not merely that a better-informed party sells without dis-
closing what he knows about the sold items. Rather, it is that the
directors may not be, as the investors have a right to expect,
faithful agents of the investors. It does not seem a very great
stretch to conclude that the promoter, who controls the activities
of the directors and is the main beneficiary of their breach of
duty, might bear some responsibility for this state of affairs.
Courts have responded to the promoter problem by declaring
that, prior to the selection of a genuinely independent board of
directors, a promoter occupies a fiduciary position with respect to
the corporation.2 ' But there are many varieties of fiduciary du-
ties. The principal duty courts have imposed on the promoter is
to disclose the nature and extent of his financial interest.2 As
discussed in more detail below, there is reason to believe that
promoters and investors would agree to such a solution if given
the opportunity to bargain.23 Would-be investors who under-
stand the promoter problem want to know how much of the funds
being raised in the offering will go toward the payment of com-
missions, fees, and similar expenses; whether the persons to
whom those amounts are being paid have any preexisting rela-
tionship with the promoter or directors that might call into ques-
tion whether the terms reflect arm's-length bargaining; and,
20 Contracts entered into by the promoter on behalf of a company prior to the
company's creation bind the company if they are ratified by the directors following its
creation. See Stringer v Electronics Supply Corp., 23 Del Chanc 79, 2 A2d 78, 79-80
(1938).
2 See, for example, Public Investment Ltd v Bandeirante Corp., 740 F2d 1222, 1234
n 72 (DC Cir 1984); Smith v Bitter, 319 NW2d 196, 200 (Iowa 1982).
See Part H.B.
" See Part IVA
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generally, what other financial interests the promoter, directors,
or persons connected with them have in the offering. (For exam-
ple, is the promoter the beneficial owner of any of the property
being purchased with the issue proceeds?) I will use the term
"agency information" as a catchall for information fitting into any
of those categories. A mandatory disclosure system that focuses
principally on agency information follows what I call the "agency
cost model" of disclosure.
This definition of agency information is deliberately restric-
tive. It is limited to information about significant transactions
between the corporation and a corporate promoter or manager.
The agency problems of concern here do not encompass the full
range of problems normally discussed in the literature on corpo-
rate governance (including the problem of insufficient effort by
the agent). Rather, the focus is on a narrower set of agency prob-
lems involving agent misbehavior, with which the common law of
agency has traditionally been concerned. My claim is that man-
datory disclosure is a reasonably effective means of dealing with
this limited subset of agency problems, and has been proven so in
other contexts. Mandatory securities disclosure rules arose out of,
and in their infancy closely tracked, the disclosure obligations
traditionally owed by an agent when dealing adversely with his
principal. Although other sorts of agency problems exist, they
were not the source of mandatory disclosure rules, and I do not
believe they can be effectively addressed through mandatory
disclosure rules. If they could be so addressed, one could recast
the accuracy enhancement model in agency cost terms by arguing
that all information about a company's performance is relevant to
the shareholders' attempts to monitor managers. For my pur-
poses, however, "agency information" is a distinctive set of infor-
mation about the agent's use of his delegated powers to sell his
own property or services to the principal.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN ENGLAND
This Part examines the extent to which disclosure rules are
and have been concerned with agency information, as opposed to
the much broader category of accuracy-enhancing information
(which encompasses any information that would affect the stock
price). My argument is that mandatory disclosure got its start as
a means of forcing disclosure of agency information in order to
control the promoter problem. A substantial body of English case
law arising prior to the first comprehensive disclosure statute,
enacted by Parliament in 1900, shows that the promoter problem
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was significant. It also appears clear from the legislative history
that the promoter problem was foremost in the minds of the
legislators who enacted the initial disclosure law. Parliament's
solution to the problem largely replicated, and expanded to some
extent, the preexisting judicial solutions.
A. The Promoter Problem
Companies that raised capital by sales of stock to the public
in nineteenth-century England were mostly promotional ven-
tures.' In that era, English companies, like their counterparts
in the United States, used high par value stocks, and the pur-
chase price at issuance was usually equal to par." Today this
use of high par value stocks seems puzzling, but in its original
context it served a useful purpose.26 The formation of a company
and its initial offering of stock to the public normally went hand-
in-hand. The entrepreneur, or promoter, would describe his idea
to potential investors, orally or by a written prospectus, and seek
subscriptions for stock. The potential investor signed a subscrip-
tion agreement providing that if sufficient subscriptions were ob-
tained, the investor would buy a certain quantity of stock. The
pace of communication necessarily dictated that the process of
seeking and obtaining subscriptions was more leisurely than that
of a modern public offering. Under these conditions, a subscriber
might be concerned that other, more favored subscribers were
receiving stock at lower prices. High par value stocks alleviated
this concern because each purchaser was required by statute to
pay at least the par value of his shares." A purchaser who paid
no more than par therefore knew he was getting as good a deal
as any other purchaser.
24 James Jefferys notes existing publicly held companies raising new capital by sales
of stock beginning in 1885, although he concludes that existing companies began to be
significant competitors for new capital beginning only in 1900. See James B. Jefferys,
Business Organization in Great Britain: 1856-1914 147-49 (Arno, 1977).
' See J.B. Jefferys, The Denomination and Character of Shares, 1855-1885, 16 Econ
Hist Rev 45, 45-51 (1946). As to American practice, see Bayless Manning and James J.
Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital 28 (Foundation, 3d ed 1990).
2 The following discussion draws on Manning and Hanks's history of high-par stocks.
See Manning and Hanks, Legal Capital at 22-28.
' The concept of limited liability entered the Companies Acts through the device of
the "company limited by shares," or "limited" company, in which "the Liability of its
Members [is] limited to the Amount unpaid on their Shares." Companies Act, 1862, 25 &
26 Vict, ch 89, § 8. A member (shareholder) who had not paid his "contribution" (par
value) in full was liable to creditors for the shortfall. Id § 38.
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The price of this certainty, however, was that future stock
issues were difficult. It would be unlikely that at the time of a
subsequent issue, the market value of the outstanding stock
would be exactly equal to the par value. In addition, shares were
typically sold partly-paid; that is, only a portion of the par value
was paid at the outset, typically 15 to 40 percent, and the sub-
scriber was liable for the difference.28 Thus, the need for addi-
tional capital could be met for some time by calls against the
unpaid portion of the existing shares, reducing the need to sell
new shares. It was an operating assumption of promoters that a
company would originate with a stated capital in excess of the
immediate needs of the business, and future capital needs would
be met by a combination of retained earnings, borrowing, and
additional calls of the unpaid capital.29
The observation that most stock sales were made by promo-
tional companies is important in understanding the structure of
English disclosure regulation. New-issue disclosure was thought
of principally in relation to promotional companies. A business-
man providing evidence in 1895 to the Departmental Committee
of the Board of Trade, also known as the Davey Committee, drew
an explicit distinction between problems arising at the time of
company formation and those present on an ongoing basis. The
former, he argued, related principally to the protection of pro-
spective shareholders, while the latter related principally to the
protection of creditors."0 That belief appears to have influenced
the way in which Parliament approached disclosure regulation.
Periodic public disclosure by corporations for the benefit of
creditors was a settled feature of English company law from its
beginning. The first general corporate law, enacted in 1844,31
did not provide for limited liability. Accordingly, the company
was required to file a biannual public statement noting transfers
' See P.L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance: 1830-1914 84-86 (Methuen, 1979) (analyzing
data from 1856 to 1882).
See, for example, Report of the Select Committee on Limited Liability Acts, 10 Brit
Parl Papers 393, 436-37 (1867) ("1867 Report") (testimony of William Newmarch, Esq.).
Newmarch argued in favor of permitting companies to reduce their stated capital if it
turned out that the capital needs of the business could be met from retained earnings. He
argued that the possibility of future capital calls had inhibited the development of a sec-
ondary market in the shares of some companies.
' See Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to
Inquire what Amendments are Necessary in the Acts Relating to Joint Stock Companies
Incorporated with Limited Liability under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, 88 Brit Parl
Papers 151, 239 (1895) ("1895 Report") (memorandum of Samuel Ogden, J.P.).
" An Act for the Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint Stock Compa-
nies, 7 & 8 Vict, ch 110 (1844).
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of its shares, so that creditors would know the names and ad-
dresses of current investors in the event of nonpayment." Even
after the advent of limited liability, companies still issued partly
paid shares (a practice thought essential to make the company
creditworthy3 ), and corporate laws therefore still required an
annual filing of shareholder names and addresses and the
amount of their unpaid subscriptions. 4 It was natural that Par-
liament saw periodic disclosure and new-issue disclosure as serv-
ing two entirely different purposes.
A common form of new-company promotion in the late nine-
teenth century involved the purchase of an existing business or
asset from its owner. 5 The new corporation was sometimes
formed by the owner himself, but toward the end of the century
the owner frequently used the services of a professional promot-
er.3" A trustee acting on behalf of the prospective company en-
tered into a contract to purchase the business or asset contingent
upon a sufficient amount of capital being raised from the pub-
lic. 37 This trustee was typically an associate of the promoter,
and his interests were aligned with those of the promoter rather
than those of the incoming investors. The promoter drafted and
filed the memorandum and articles (the charter) of the company,
which stated that one of the purposes of the company was to
consummate the purchase of the business or asset. The promoter
then selected an initial board of directors and printed up a pro-
spectus, describing the business and soliciting subscriptions for
stock. When sufficient subscriptions were obtained, the stock was
issued and the transactions described in the prospectus and the
memorandum and articles were completed.
Such promotions were ripe for the development of the pro-
moter problem, which took two basic forms. Often the promoter's
entrepreneurial talent lay in identifying businesses that might be
more efficiently operated in corporate form, purchasing those
See id ch 110, § XI.
See, for example, 1867 Report 187 at 414 (cited in note 29) (evidence of the Hon-
orable Edward C. Curzon); Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 171 (cited
in note 24).
See Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict, ch 89, § 26.
See J.H. Clapham, 3 An Economic History of Modern Britain 360 (Cambridge, 2d
ed 1963); Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 126 (cited in note 24).
' Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 294-314 (cited in note 24). See
also Cottrell, Industrial Finance at 113-41 (cited in note 28) (description of one prominent
promoter's conversions of iron, coal, and steel concerns to limited liability form).
, For a description of the professional promoter's role, see Francis B. Palmer,
Palmer's Company Law 225 (Stevens & Sons, 1st ed 1898).
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businesses, and promptly reselling them to newly formed corpo-
rations at a profit.38 The promoter, then, was often also the ven-
dor to the corporation of its principal assets. In order to hide the
extent of his profit, the promoter sometimes arranged a series of
sales to nominees at increasing prices, a practice known as "load-
ing" the purchase price.89 The last such nominee was named as
the owner of the business in the prospectus. The prospectus could
then truthfully state that the (nominal) vendor had recently
purchased the property for a sum only slightly less than the price
being paid by the new company, when in fact the real party in
interest had purchased at a much lower price.4"
That the practice of "loading" the purchase price was wide-
spread appears clear from both the evidence presented to Parlia-
ment and the case law. In 1900, one of the Law Lords described a
fact pattern occurring "over and over again":
[The promoters] issue a prospectus representing that they
had agreed to purchase the property for a sum largely in
excess of the amount which they had, in fact, to
pay.... Secretly, and therefore dishonestly, they put into
their own pockets the difference between the real and the
pretended price. After a brief career the company is ordered
to be wound up. In the course of the liquidation the trick is
discovered.4
A second common practice was to omit any mention in the
prospectus that fees would be paid to a professional promoter.42
A vendor sometimes hired a financier to help with the formation
See id at 325.
For a description of the practice, see 1895 Report $ 27 at 161 (cited in note 30). For
examples, see Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App Cas 1218, 1218-23 (IL
1878); Whaley Bridge Calico Printing Co. v Green, 5 QB Div 109, 109-10 (1879).
"' The usefulness of the device to promoters is testified to by the fact that it still
occurs, despite more than a century of judicial and legislative attempts to prevent it. See
Azrielli v Cohen Law Offices, 21 F3d 512 (2d Cir 1994). There, a defendant purchased an
apartment building for $770,000 and sold it to certain other defendants for $989,000. The
latter defendants then created a corporation and sold it the building "at cost." Plaintiffs,
who purchased shares in the corporation, brought a securities fraud action, claiming that
the intermediate transaction was a sham designed to hide the fact that the arm's-length
sale price was $770,000 rather than $989,000.
4' Gluckstein v Barnes, App Cas 240, 248 (HL 1900) (Macnaghten opinion). In that
case, the vendors/promoters stated that they had purchased the business in question for a
certain sum, without noting that part of the purchase price had been paid in outstanding
debt securities of the business that they had acquired for a nominal sum, making the
effective purchase price considerably less.
' See, for example, Emma Silver Mining Co. v Grant, 11 Chanc Div 918, 918-25
(1879) (promoter's fees not disclosed to investors).
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and flotation of a company, and this professional promoter typi-
cally received a fee for his services from the vendor. Omitting the
amount of such fees from the prospectus was not insignificant;
promotional fees sometimes amounted to as much as 50 percent
of the supplied capital.' In addition, there is anecdotal evidence
that companies formed with low promotional fees survived at a
much higher rate than those formed with high fees." In short,
investors were right to be concerned with nondisclosure of promo-
tional fees.
To some extent, English law facilitated this practice of hiding
the professional promoter's interest. The courts had created con-
fusion about whether a company had the power to expend money
in connection with its own flotation." This helped create de-
mand for professional promoters because the company itself was
wary of offering an underwriting commission or discount. The
promoter's contractual relations were with the vendor rather
than the company. This facilitated deception because the prospec-
tus could truthfully state that the company was paying no pro-
motional fees; when challenged, the vendor and professional
promoter argued that the promoter's commission was a private
matter between them."
Both commentary and case law leave little doubt that the
practice of hiding promotional fees, like the practice of "loading"
+' Cottrell, Industrial Finance at 131 (cited in note 28).
See id at 115, 131, 137 (noting one prominent promoter's successful ventures and
his low fees); Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 301-302, (cited in note
24) (noting high promoter expenses and instability of companies promoted by "credit asso-
ciations"); Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy 19 (Methuen, 2d ed 1983)
(noting high rate of insolvency among new public companies and contemporary "strong
suspicion" of a link to "crooked," speculating promoters); HA. Shannon, The First Five
Thousand Limited Companies and Their Duration, 7 Econ Hist 396, 411-13 (1932) (noting
high "mortality" rate for public companies and linking it to the "misdoings" of promoters).
Although of course it may be coincidental, the secular trend of survival rates of new
promotions was downward during the second half of the nineteenth century as intermedi-
aries became increasingly a part of company formation. As to the increasing role of
intermediaries, see Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 294-309 (cited in
note 24). As to the decline in survival rates, see HA Shannon, The Limited Companies of
1866-1883, 4 Econ Hist Rev 290, 295 (1933).
See Palmer, Palmer's Company Law at 231 (cited in note 37). In 1896, the Court of
Appeal concluded that if the memorandum and articles permitted payment of an under-
writing commission, a reasonable commission could lawfully be paid. Metropolitan Coal
Consumers' Ass'n v Scrimgeour, 2 QB 604 (Ct App 1895). The Companies Act 1900, put
the matter to rest by expressly permitting payment of underwriting commissions or dis-
counts when authorized by the articles or disclosed in the prospectus. 63 & 64 Vict, ch 48,
§ 8.
" See, for example, Lydney & Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v Bird, 33 Chanc Div 85, 86-88
(Ct App 1886).
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the purchase price, was widespread. In 1877, a judge of the Court
of Appeal complained that "[t]hese cases have been so often be-
fore the Court unfortunately of late years .. . ."' A single pro-
moter, Albert Grant, who styled himself "the prince of promot-
ers,"48 accounted for at least three reported cases during the
1870s. 49 Each had similar facts. Grant agreed with the vendor to
form the company and solicit subscriptions in return for cash fees
and other remuneration approximating 20 to 30 percent of the
capital raised. Grant's interest in the promotion was not stated
in the prospectus.
B. The Judicial Response
Both of the practices described above were carefully designed
to avoid clear-cut fraud. The statements made in the prospectus
about the ownership of the business, or about the expenses to be
paid by the company, were technically true. They were also, how-
ever, manifestly incomplete to the point of being seriously mis-
leading. The courts thus might have dealt with these practices by
simply concluding that they amounted to fraudulent concealment
or "half-truths."" Instead, however, the courts chose a doctrinal
approach that responded to the essence of the problem: the self-
interested use of money entrusted to the promoter and his associ-
ates by investors. The courts perceived the underlying agency
problem and dealt with it using familiar tools from the law of
agency.
Specifically, they concluded that a promoter was a fiduciary
of the corporation and therefore had a duty to disclose an interest
adverse to that of the corporation.5 The solution made sense.
The promoter had to disclose his adverse interest to his principal,
the corporation. Thus, he had either to provide a genuinely inde-
pendent board of directors and disclose his interest to it, or to dis-
, Bagnall v Carlton, 6 Chanc Div 371, 398-99 (Ct App 1877) (James opinion).
See Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 304 (cited in note 24).
49 Bagnall, 6 Chanc Div 371; Twycross v Grant, 2 Common Pleas Div 469 (Ct App
1877); Emma Silver Mining Co. v Grant, 11 Chanc Div 918 (1879). See also Rubery v
Grant, 13 L Rep-Eq 443, 443-45 (Vice Chanc 1872) (suit by vendor against Grant for
specific performance of promotional contract; vendor alleged that Grant had taken a
larger portion of the proceeds than permitted by the contract).
' For modern examples, see Mends v Dykstra, 195 Mont 440, 637 P2d 502, 508
(1981) (real estate vendor's statements, "while not strictly untrue," were highly mislead-
ing); Lindberg Cadillac Co. v Aron, 371 SW2d 651, 653 (Mo App 1963) (automobile vendor
concealed engine cracks by filling them in; court found "fraudulent concealment").
1 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App Cas 1218 (HL 1878). See, for
example, id at 1229-30 (Penzance opinion); id at 1236 (Cairns opinion).
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close his interest to the prospective investors.52 The net result in
either event was to make it impossible for the promoter to stand
on both sides of the transaction; he had to bargain over the price
of his property and services with either the independent directors
or the prospective investors.
The more difficult issue for the courts involved the precise
contours of the fiduciary duty. It was clear that the promoter had
to disclose, but what did he have to disclose, and what was the
appropriate remedy if he failed to do so? It was clear from an
early date that if a promoter sold property to the corporation
without disclosing his interest to the independent directors or
shareholders, the company could seek rescission of the sale.53 If
successful, the company recaptured the shareholders' money from
the promoter and reconveyed the property to him. In that event,
rescission wiped out both any gain the promoter had obtained
and any loss the company had suffered.
The courts had more trouble, however, deciding what stan-
dards should govern if rescission of the purchase was no longer
feasible at the time the promoter's interest was discovered. In
that event, the company might seek disgorgement of the ven-
dor/promoter's profit, a common remedy for breach of trust. The
courts' willingness to force the promoter to disgorge, however,
turned in part on when and how the promoter had acquired the
property he later sold to the corporation. If the promoter had
begun to form the company prior to or simultaneously with his
purchase, a court would conclude that he had purchased as a
constructive trustee for the corporation, and the corporation was
therefore entitled to any profit the promoter had made.' 4 If the
promoter made his purchase before he set in motion the creation
of the company, however, he could argue that at the time of his
purchase, he was not acting as agent for the company, but pur-
chasing on his own behalf for eventual resale. While he could
still be required to disclose his financial interest to the company
once he had become a fiduciary, he was not a constructive trust-
ee, and his failure to disclose should entitle the company only to
recover any damages it could prove.
" See id at 1236 (Cairns opinion) (disclosure to independent directors); Salomon v
Salomon, App Cas 22, 33 (HL 1897) (disclosure to shareholders as valid alternative to
disclosure to directors).
= See Erlanger, 3 App Cas at 1218, 1229.
See id at 1235 (Cairns opinion).
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The courts were sympathetic to this line of reasoning. In In
re Cape Breton Co., the first case that squarely presented the
issue, the Court of Appeal concluded that once rescission had
become impossible, the shareholders could not bring an action to
recover the promoter's profit.5 The House of Lords affirmed, and
one opinion suggested that the company's only recourse would be
to recover any damages that it could prove resulted from the
nondisclosure.56 In subsequent cases, however, the Court of Ap-
peal backed away from the seemingly broad holding of Cape
Breton. In one case the court held that the defendants, who had
agreed among themselves to form a corporation at the time they
purchased a property, were liable to disgorge their profit in con-
nection with the purchase and resale." In another case, a judge
suggested that Cape Breton was limited to situations in which
the company's shareholders declined to seek rescission when it
was still possible, and later sought damages.58 Nevertheless, the
precise location of the line separating a promoter who had to dis-
gorge his profits from one who needed only to pay any damages
the company could prove was ambiguous. Thus, although the
formal rule was that the promoter had to disclose the extent of
any profits arising from his agency, the applicability of that rule
to a promoter who sold previously-acquired property was not
clear.
Before Parliament occupied the field, then, courts had allevi-
ated the promoter problem by requiring promoters to disclose
adverse interests to an independent party, be it the directors or
the investors. Neither the scope of the duty nor the remedy was
completely settled. What the investors desired, by contrast, was
firmly established. They wanted to know how much profit pro-
moters were making. The subsequent history of securities regula-
tion is largely a history of how the investors got their way.
See In re Cape Breton Co., 29 Chanc Div 795, 803-06 (Ct App 1885) (Cotton opin-
ion), aff'd as Cavendish Bentinck v Fenn, 12 App Cas 652 (HL 1887). See also Ladywell
Mining Co. v Brookes, 35 Chanc Div 400, 407-09 (Ct App 1887) (Cotton opinion) (following
Cape Breton).
Cavendish Bentinck, 12 App Cas at 661-62 (Herschell opinion).
In re Olympia Ltd., 2 Chanc 153, 170-71 (Ct App 1898), aff'd as Gluckstein v
Barnes, App Cas 240 (HL 1900).
' Lydney & Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v Bird, 33 Chanc Div 85, 94 (Ct App 1886).
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C. The Legislative Response
The Companies Act 1900 ("1900 Act")59 was the first statute
in Anglo-American law to impose comprehensive disclosure re-
quirements on companies selling securities to the public. The
1900 Act was the culmination of nearly thirty-five years of debate
over the proper scope of the promoter's duty of disclosure. Parlia-
ment had taken its first tentative step toward mandatory disclo-
sure by enacting Section 38 of the Companies Act, 1867.60 Sec-
tion 38 provided that a prospectus must disclose the parties to
and dates of "any contract entered into by the company, or the
promoters, directors, or trustees thereof, before the issue of such
prospectus .... ."" The statute gave a direct right of action to
shareholders, notwithstanding their lack of privity with the pro-
moter and directors. Failure to make the required disclosures
was deemed fraudulent "as regards any person taking shares in
the company on the faith of such prospectus .. 62
Section 38 was most directly a response to the failure of the
Overend Gurney bank, which had touched off the Panic of
1866.63 Not long before it collapsed, Overend Gurney had been
converted from a partnership to a corporation.' Its prospectus
failed to disclose a separate agreement between the partnership
and the corporation under which the partners retained and man-
aged a pool of questionable loans. The partners guaranteed to the
corporation payment when due of the balance of the loans. The
loans went bad, and the partners had insufficient assets to satis-
fy the guarantee. Shareholders argued that had they been told of
the arrangement, they would have realized that the bank had a
poor loan portfolio and would not have invested.
One might accordingly view Section 38 as a first step toward
requiring detailed disclosures about the business itself, as op-
posed to the underlying agency problems. Agency issues, howev-
er, were not absent from the Overend Gurney situation: the di-
63 & 64 Vict, ch 48.
ro 30 & 31 Vict, ch 131, § 38.
61 Id (capitalization modernized).
Id (capitalization modernized).
See Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in Eng-
land, 1800-1867 153-156 (Harvard, 1936); Cottrell, Industrial Finance at 62 (cited in note
28).
The facts are taken from the subsequent litigation, In re Overend, Gurney & Co., 3
L Rep-Eq 576, 577-90 (Vice Chanc 1867), aff'd as Oakes v Turquand & Harding, 2 Eng &
Irish App 325 (1867). See also Overend, Gurney, & Co. v Gurney, 4 Chanc App 701, 702-07
(1869), aff'd as Overend & Gurney Co. v Gibb, 5 Eng & Irish App 480 (1872).
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rectors who failed to make adequate disclosure of the side agree-
ment were also members of the former partnership, suggesting
that the terms of the side agreement did not reflect arm's-length
bargaining. Alternatively, then, Section 38 might be considered
an attempt to deal with the promoter problem by giving investors
a direct right of action against promoters and directors.
Section 38 had an unimpressive life, principally because the
courts were unsure what it meant. Some courts initially reacted
to this uncertainty by giving the statute a reading so narrow as
to make it almost wholly ineffective. Those courts concluded that
Section 38 applied only to contracts binding on the company
itself, thus making it inapplicable to contracts between vendors
and promoters.65 Eventually, however, the courts came to view
Section 38 as another weapon for attacking the promoter prob-
lem. In 1880, the Court of Appeal conclusively determined that
the statute covered contracts between a vendor and promoter.66
Of the eight cases construing Section 38 that appear in the Law
Reports, six involve nondisclosure of a promoter's financial inter-
est.6" The other two involve nondisclosure of a director's finan-
cial interest.68
When Parliament considered amending the Companies Act
in the 1890s, it sought a more comprehensive solution to the
promoter problem. With the 1900 Act, it mandated specific disclo-
sures in new-issue prospectuses. The list of items to be disclosed,
which appears in Section 10(1) of the 1900 Act, focused clearly on
the promoter problem. The list included the names of the vendors
of any property to be purchased with proceeds from the issue;69
all consideration paid for such property;"0 all consideration paid
' See In re Coal Economising Gas Company (Gover's Case), 1 Chanc Div 182, 189 (Ct
App 1875) (James opinion). See also Twycross v Grant, 2 Common Pleas Div 469, 497 (Ct
App 1877) (Bramwell opinion).
' See Sullivan v Mitcalfe, 5 Common Pleas Div 455, 458-61 (Ct App 1880) (Thesiger
opinion).
' Aaron's Reefs, Ltd. v Twiss, App Cas 273 (HL 1896); Greenwood v Leather Shod
Wheel Co., [1900] 1 Chanc 421 (Ct App); Sullivan, 5 Common Pleas Div 455; Twycross, 2
Common Pleas Div 469; Cover's Case, 1 Chanc Div at 182; Craig v Phillips, 3 Chanc Div
722 (1876). See also Capel & Co. v Sim's Ships Composition Co., 58 L Times Rep 807
(Chanc 1888); Re The Ruby Consolidated Mining Co. (Askew's Case), 22 Weekly Rep 762
(Chanc 1874), rev'd, 9 Chanc App 664 (1874).
' Arkwright v Newbold, 17 Chanc Div 301 (Ct App 1881); Cornell v Hay, 8 Common
Pleas Div 328 (1873). See also Charlton v Hay, 31 L Times Rep 437 (QB Div 1874) (simi-
lar facts).
' Companies Act 1900, 63 & 64 Vict, ch 48, § 10(1)(f).
70 Id § 10(1)(g).
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in connection with securing subscriptions for the stock;7 all oth-
er preliminary expenses;' all consideration paid to promot-
ers;73 and "full particulars" of every director's financial interest
in either the promotion or any property to be acquired by the
company.74 The requirement to disclose the identity of the ven-
dors extended to all vendors-both direct and indirect-who
would receive cash or securities in connection with the new issue.
A promoter was therefore forced to disclose not only that he was
financially interested, but also the amount of profit he stood to
make if his purchase of any property to be resold to the corpora-
tion was contingent on the flotation or otherwise uncompleted at
the time of flotation, if any part of his purchase price was to be
paid with the issue proceeds, or if he was a director of the newly-
formed company.75 The list also included a modified version of
the prior Section 38, altered to clarify that the section's purpose
was to combat the promoter problem. The new provision required
disclosure of the dates and parties for every material contract en-
tered into within three years prior to publication of the prospec-
tus, but exempted contracts entered into in the ordinary course of
business.76 The language of the statute thus leaves little doubt
that Parliament's principal aim was to guard against the two
forms of the promoter problem, as described above. 7
71 Id § 10(l)(h).
' Id § 10(1)(i). The use of the phrase "preliminary expenses" to describe the expenses
of the issue again suggests that Parliament thought that stock sales were made principal-
ly by promotional companies.
" Id § 10(1)j).
Id § 10(1)(m).
" This is how contemporary practitioners understood the working of the 1900 Act.
See F. Gore-Browne and William Jordan, A Handy Book on the Formation, Management
and Winding Up of Joint Stock Companies 97-99 (Jordan & Sons, 23d ed 1900). The
promoter's contract of purchase from the original owner, so long as made within three
years of the date of the flotation, would also be covered by the requirement to disclose
material contracts. Id at 98, 101.
" Companies Act 1900, 63 & 64 Vict, ch 48, § 10(1)(k). The requirement to disclose
material contracts reaching back three years is not inconsistent with a concern for the
promoter problem. Although the corporation typically was newly formed, the business
being purchased by the new corporation had often been in operation for many years. The
likely purpose of the three-year cutoff was to catch any sale of the business to anyone
connected with the promoter over a reasonable period prior to the promotion.
7 See Cottrell, Industrial Finance at 74 (cited in note 28) ("It is clear from ... its
contents that the main burden of the 1900 Act dealt with the problem of frauds on share-
holders by promoters, especially those involving the loading of the purchase price.").
I put aside for later the question whether legislative involvement was necessary to
assure these disclosures, or whether self-interest would have led promoters to disclose vol-
untarily. See Part 1VWA. Based on the above history, disclosure of promoters' fees and
profits, whether voluntary or mandatory, was inevitable.
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At the same time, the rhetoric of English policymakers and
commentators of the 1890s, like that of their American counter-
parts in the 1930s, suggested a broader effort than simply refin-
ing the judicial solutions to the promoter problem. Disclosure was
described as a means of improving investment decisions and
preventing frauds. A statement to this effect from the report of
the Davey Committee is cited in modern discussions of disclosure
regulation:
It may be a counsel of perfection and impossible of attain-
ment to say that a prospectus shall disclose everything
which could reasonably influence the mind of an investor of
average prudence. But this in the opinion of your Committee
is the ideal to be aimed at, and for this purpose to secure the
utmost publicity is the end to which new legislation on the
formation of companies should be directed. 8
The rhetoric, however, is misleading, for it deflects attention
from what Parliament actually did, which was merely to depart
incrementally from accepted equity principles. Where the courts
had provided a remedy to a company that lacked actual or con-
structive knowledge of a promoter's interest, Parliament provided
a list of precise disclosures relating to the interests of promoters
and directors, and made the promoters and directors directly
liable to investors for failing to make those disclosures." Tell-
ingly, while Parliament largely followed the language of the
Davey Committee's draft bill, it removed a clause in the draft
requiring disclosure of "every material fact known to any director
or promoter of the company who is a party to the issue of the prospec-
Us.
" s0
At the same time, the gap between rhetoric and reality may
not be as wide as it appears at first glance. Our understanding of
the language of the debate has been shaped by the subsequent
history of the mandatory disclosure system. If we focus instead
on the original context, which was the promoter problem, the
links between such broad rhetoric and the narrower aim of the
statute become clear. The disclosure of professional promoters'
fees was less of a problem by 1900, as judicial decisions had
78 1895 Report at 156, § 6, quoted in Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, 1 Securities
Regulation 7 (Little, Brown, 1989).
79 Companies Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, ch 23, § 37 (imposing liability on directors
and promoters for untrue statements contained in a prospectus).
' The Davey Committee bill's disclosure requirements appear in the 1895 Report at
354-56 (cited in note 30). The referenced provision is in § 14(1)(1).
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apparently induced a greater amount of disclosure."' The real
issue for debate in the late 1800s was under what circumstances
a vendor/promoter had to disclose the amount of his profit.
At the time, it would be quite natural for the pro-disclosure
faction to use the phrase "all material information." After all, the
standard rule applying to an agent who sells his own property to
a principal with the principal's consent is to disclose "all facts
which... would reasonably affect the principal's judgment"
whether to buy the property. 2 When courts chastised a promot-
er or other fiduciary for failing to disclose "material facts," it was
because the fiduciary was making an undisclosed profit. The
Economist, which was a strong supporter of disclosure regulation,
used remarkably similar language in calling for disclosure of "all
the information necessary to enable a reasonable investor to form
a judgment" whether to invest.8 3 The context, however, was not
one of helping the market determine an accurate price; it was
one of informing investors about the conflicting interests of the
promoter. Across the Atlantic, the United States Supreme Court
had expressed the promoter's duty in a way that made the con-
" The incidence of failing altogether to disclose promotional fees appears to account
for fewer reported cases after about 1880 than in the two previous decades. The Econo-
mist, a persistent critic of promotional practices in the 1890s, admitted that the most
notorious promoter of that era disclosed his financial interest to a greater extent than had
other promoters. See Mr. Hooley's Bankruptcy, Economist 869 (June 11, 1898).
' Restatement of Agency § 390 (cited in note 6). See Dunne v English, 18 L Rep-Eq
524, 533 (1874):
It is not enough for an agent to tell the principal that he is going to have an interest
in the purchase, or to have a part in the purchase. He must tell him all the material
facts. He must make a full disclosure.
The facts of the Dunne case are ironic. English, like many promoters, purchased a proper-
ty and promptly sold it to a corporation for more than double what he had paid. The cor-
poration prospered, and so English faced no lawsuits based on his promotion. However, he
had also acted as agent for the original vendor. He disclosed to the vendor that he was
the purchaser, but failed to disclose that at the time of the purchase, he had already put
into motion the creation of the company and the sale of the property to it at a huge profit.
The vendor successfully sued to recover English's profit. The court made it clear that the
"material fact" English failed to disclose was the profit he stood to gain on his purchase
and sale. Id at 535-38.
Company Law Reform, Economist 1619, 1619-20 (Nov 12, 1898). See also The Law
of Limited Liability, Economist 662, 662 (May 26, 1888):
[All that is required is, that an intending investor shall have at his disposal the
facts upon which to form his judgment. For this purpose, it would be necessary that
all contracts referring to the property to be acquired should be specified. At present,
it is too often the custom simply to set out the contract between the immediate ven-
dor and the company, and in this way it is possible to give either practically no infor-
mation at all, or to convey an utterly false impression of the true facts of the case.
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text clear: "if persons start a company... for the purpose of sell-
ing property to the company when organized, they must faithfully
disclose all facts relating to the property which would influence"
investors." In that context, the most material fact of all, and
the one that occupied center stage in the debate, was the price
the promoter had paid for the property.
III. THE BACKGROUND OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN THE
UNITED STATES
At the time of their enactment, the United States securities
laws represented a more substantial departure from prior legal
norms than did the English disclosure statutes. Yet the first
federal securities statute, and the only one concerned primarily
with disclosure, draws heavily on the English precedents. Like
the 1900 Act, the Securities Act is designed principally to deal
with the promoter problem. The disclosure provisions of the Secu-
rities Act are therefore consistent with the agency cost model.
In making the claim that the disclosure regime provided by
Congress targeted the promoter problem, I am not contending
that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority by using mandato-
ry disclosure for other purposes. Congress gave the SEC the
authority to redesign the disclosure system as circumstances
warranted, and Congress has not protested as the SEC has used
that authority. Nevertheless, had the SEC not made such com-
prehensive use of its powers, the United States mandatory disclo-
sure system would look quite similar to the English disclosure
system on which it was modeled-that is, it would be focused
principally on the promoter problem. In looking for an efficiency
explanation for mandatory disclosure, we should not overlook the
system that Congress borrowed from England in 1933.
A. The Promoter Problem and the Judicial Response
Reported cases in state courts prior to 1933 provide evidence
that the promoter problem and judicial attempts to address it did
not differ greatly between England and the United States. Ameri-
can vendor/promoters often sought to conceal their interest in
property sold to the corporation.85 The fact patterns of many of
' Dickerman v Northern Trust Co., 176 US 181, 204 (1899), quoting Victor Morawetz,
1 A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations §§ 291, 294, 546 (Little, Brown, 2d ed
1886) (emphasis added).
' See, for example, Lomita Land & Water Co. v Robinson, 154 Cal 36, 97 P 10, 11-13
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the unfaithful promoter cases of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries are quite similar to those of unfaithful real estate bro-
ker cases of the same era. The latter often involved a real estate
agent who sold the principal's property to a nominee, who in turn
sold it to the agent.86 The concepts and terms the courts used to
deal with cases involving unfaithful promoters and directors are
nearly identical to those employed in cases involving unfaithful
real estate brokers." State courts, like the English courts, fash-
ioned a law to deal with the promoter problem, and many of the
American cases cite the English precedents." Fixing the specific
contours of the promoter's fiduciary duty posed similar doctrinal
difficulties for courts on both sides of the Atlantic. The Supreme
Court concluded in 1908 that the promoter's fiduciary obligation
to disclose his interest in property sold to the corporation could
be discharged by making the sale at a time when the promoter
owned all of the outstanding stock." The promoter could imme-
diately thereafter sell additional stock to the public without dis-
closing that he was the vendor to the corporation of the corporate
assets."
(1908); Wills v Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or 70, 96 P 528, 530 (1908); Yale Gas-Stove Co. v
Wilcox, 64 Conn 101, 29 A 303, 304 (1894).
' See, for example, Hogle v Meyering, 161 Mich 472, 126 NW 1063, 1064 (1910);
Easterly v Mills, 54 Wash 356, 103 P 475, 476 (1909). Compare Humphrey v Eddy Trans-
portation Co., 107 Mich 163, 65 NW 13, 13-14 (1895) (agent hired to sell two boats ar-
ranged sale to a nominee, who then resold them to a company partly owned by agent).
' Compare, for example, Tegarden v Big Star Zinc Co., 71 Ark 277, 72 SW 989, 991
(1903) (promoters may not "make a secret profit out of their purchases for the corpora-
tion"), with Hogle, 126 NW at 1068 (real estate agent may not "make a secret profit out of
the agency"); and Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v Bigelow, 188 Mass 315,
74 NE 653, 658 (1905) (promoter is "bound to disclose all facts known to him material in
the sale" and may not conceal his interest by putting title in a "man of straw"), with
Kingsley v Wheeler, 95 Minn 360, 104 NW 543, 544 (1905) (real estate agent "owes the
duty of making a full, fair, and prompt disclosure of all facts" and may not conceal his
interest by making intermediate sale to a "man of straw").
' The leading American case is Yale Gas-Stove Co., 29 A 303. See also Yeiser v
United States Board & Paper Co., 107 F 340 (6th Cir 1901); Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co. v Bigelow, 203 Mass 159, 89 NE 193 (1909), aff'd, 225 US 111 (1912).
' Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v Lewisohn, 210 US 206, 209, 212
(1908) (Holmes opinion).
English judges similarly concluded that disclosure to all the initial shareholders
was sufficient, at least when the plaintift was a liquidator of the corporation or a purchas-
er of shares issued long after the company's formation. However, a number of them
suggested that a person who purchased shares shortly after the company's formation
could make a claim against the promoter. See In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., 17
Chanc Div 467, 477 (Ct App 1881) (James opinion); id at 478 (Brett opinion); In re
Ambrose Lake Tin & Copper Mining Co., 14 Chanc Div 390, 397 (Ct App 1880) (Brett
opinion).
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As in England, the most difficult issue was whether the pro-
moter had to disclose the extent of his profit, since the promoter's
duty to disclose his adverse interest was clear at an early stage.
American courts generally required the promoter to disclose the
price he had paid for the property only if he had already become
a promoter at the time he purchased, a question of fact in each
case.9 The American courts also used the doctrine of "watered"
stock as a tool to force disclosure of a promoter's profit. Corporate
codes typically permitted the issuance of stock in return for prop-
erty or services contributed to the corporation, but these had to
be worth at least the par value of the stock received in return, a
serious constraint .in an era of high-par stocks.92 If the promoter
took stock with a par value in excess of the "value" of the
property and services he provided, his stock was considered "wa-
tered." He was then liable to the company's creditors for the
amount of the shortfall.93
The watered stock issue had a direct connection to account-
ing principles. If the promoter and his associates owned all of the
company's outstanding stock prior to the initial public offering,
the company's balance sheet had to record the assets at the valu-
ation the promoter had placed on them in order to bring the
assets into balance with the capital account (the aggregate par
value of the outstanding shares). An example may be useful.
Assume a promoter purchases a factory for $10,000 and subse-
quently forms a corporation with the objective of parting with 50
percent of his interest in the business. He takes 15,000 shares of
stock in the company, with a par value of $1 per share. Thus his
opening balance sheet shows a capital of $15,000. For the asset
and liability sides to balance, he must record the value of the
factory as $15,000. He then sells 7,500 of his 15,000 shares to the
public for $1 per share, receiving $7,500 for one-half of an asset
that he had paid $10,000 to purchase. In the event of a subse-
quent insolvency, creditors would attempt to make the promoter
directly liable for part of the company's debts by challenging the
$15,000 valuation of the factory. There were a number of
doctrines that in theory protected the promoter, such as a rule
that the directors' valuation of property was conclusive absent
"1 See Henderson v Plymouth Oil Co., 16 Del Chanc 347, 141 A 197, 203 (1928). See
generally Manfred W. Ehrich, The Law of Promoters 219-26 (Bender, 1916).
See, for example, NY Stock Corp Law § 69 (Cahill 1930).
See, for example, Flint v Sebastian, 317 Mo 1344, 300 SW 798, 804 (Mo 1927); See
v Heppenheimer, 69 NJ Eq 36, 61 A 843, 849 (1905).
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fraud.94 As a practical matter, however, a promoter in this posi-
tion ran a risk that a court would find he had "watered" his stock
if the value of the asset on the balance sheet was greater than
the price he had paid.95
The watered stock doctrine, therefore, constrained the
promoter's ability to take a large profit on a sale of property to
the corporation. That doctrine also had severe drawbacks. Most
importantly, full disclosure of the promoter's profit did not pro-
tect the promoter from the company's creditors. Even if every
investor understood and approved the promoter's receipt of stock
with a par value of $15,000 in return for property he had pur-
chased for $10,000, creditors could later challenge the transac-
tion.
While an arm's-length deal between a promoter and inves-
tors would grant the promoter some financial reward for spotting
the profit-making opportunity, the watered stock doctrine made
these rewards risky. This can be seen most easily in the context
of a common type of promotion of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries-a mining venture. Assume a promoter possesses
valuable and secret information that leads him to believe that a
particular piece of farmland contains a mineral deposit worth
$50,000. He manages to purchase the property without revealing
his information, paying $10,000. Whether the promoter sells the
property to an established mining company or forms his own
mining company and "sells" the land to its shareholders, he will
demand a price greater than $10,000. The watered stock doc-
trine, however, made it risky for him to take his compensation in
the form of stock. This was an even greater problem for promot-
ers who contributed intangible property, such as patents or valu-
able information, because early-twentieth-century courts were ex-
tremely skeptical about the "value" of intangibles.96 The net re-
sult was that vendor/promoters were open to frequent ex post
challenges for not having contributed property worth the par
value of the stock they had received.
See, for example, NY Stock Corp Law § 69.
See generally David L. Dodd, Stock Watering: The Judicial Valuation of Property
for Stock-Issue Purposes 118-33 (Columbia, 1930).
' See, for example, Gillett v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 230 IMl 373, 82 NE 891, 904-
05 (1907) (rights to an unwritten play and several unpatented inventions deemed value-
less by court, so that stock received for these intangibles "remained wholly unpaid"). See
also Dodd, Stock Watering at 98 (cited in note 95) (noting that watered stock cases arise
most frequently in connection with intangibles).
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Beginning in the 1910s, corporate codes began to permit no-
par stock, and low-par stocks began to gain market acceptance."
The watered stock doctrine therefore ceased to cause the practi-
cal difficulties outlined above. By the same token, however, the
doctrine no longer forced the disclosure of promoters' financial
interests.
The second paradigmatic promoter problem, the failure to
disclose commissions, also existed in the United States, but in a
slightly different form than in England. Rather than acting as
professional promoters, receiving commissions from the vendors,
the United States investment banks acted as underwriters, re-
ceiving discounts on the shares from the issuing companies."
While the formal arrangements differed, the underlying function
of soliciting investors did not.
Nondisclosure of underwriters' commissions lay at the very
heart of the progressives' attack on Wall Street. In support of
their arguments for a mandatory disclosure scheme, for example,
President Roosevelt and congressional supporters of the Securi-
ties Act frequently quoted Louis Brandeis's 1914 book, Other
People's Money.99 The book, however, was far from a "full disclo-
sure" manifesto. Rather, it consisted mostly of an attack on con-
centrated wealth, particularly wealth controlled by investment
b'ankers.' Its assault on investment banks has much in com-
mon with the frequent attacks in late-nineteenth-century Eng-
land on company promoters as a predatory and dishonest
class.' Brandeis's chapter on "What Publicity Can Do," the
source of the New Dealers' references to "sunlight" as the best
' See Manning and Hanks, Legal Capital at 28-30 (cited in note 25). J.B.R. Smith,
New Jersey Corporation Law 25-30 (Soney & Sage, 2d ed 1923), contains a discussion of
the legislative history of the no-par provisions that emphasizes the role of the watered
stock doctrine and its shortcomings in creating pressure for no-par stock.
" See Vincent P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History 53-54 (Harvard,
1970).
' Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (Frederick A.
Stokes, 1932). See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 41 (Houghton Mifflin,
1982) ("Rarely did Roosevelt speak about the stock market without invoking" Brandeis's
book); 77 Cong Rec H 2933 (May 5, 1933) (statements of Rep. Marland, quoting Brandeis),
reprinted in J.S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar, compilers, 1 Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Item 7 at 2933 (Fred B.
Rothman, 1973) ("Legislative History"); 77 Cong Rec H 2929 (May 5, 1933) (statement of
Rep. Kelly, quoting Brandeis), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 1 Legisla-
tive History Item 7 at 2929.
" This point is also noted in Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan L Rev 385, 405-06 & n 90 (1990).
... See Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 308-309 (cited in note 24).
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remedy for the securities markets, does not call for comprehen-
sive securities disclosure. Instead, it proposes only that
underwriters' commissions be subject to mandatory disclo-
sure.
0 2
Roosevelt's own calls for "fall disclosure" had a similar focus.
The 1932 Democratic Party platform called for:
Protection of the investing public by requiring to be filed
with the Government and carried in advertisements of all
offerings of foreign and domestic stocks and bonds true in-
formation as to bonuses, commissions, principal invested and
interests of sellers.
0 3
The platform thus focused squarely on the two elements of the
promoter problem identified by Parliament in 1900-vendors' and
professional promoters' undisclosed financial interests. This
statement falls far short of calling for disclosure of all "material
facts." Similarly, in a campaign speech, Roosevelt proposed that
"definite and accurate statements be made to the buyers in re-
spect to the bonuses and commissions the sellers are to re-
ceive." '°4 The stage was thus set for Congress to borrow the
English solution.
B. The Legislative Response
The new President and the 73d Congress identified a host of
perceived abuses in the securities markets of the 1920s. In hear-
ings that began in 1932 and ran until mid-1934, Congress exam-
ined and criticized a wide range of market practices, including
short selling, leverage, insider trading, holding company struc-
tures, mergers, and securities activities of commercial banks.' 5
The first securities statute to emerge, however, was a new-issue
disclosure statute that was similar to the disclosure provisions of
England's 1900 Act, provisions which had been carried over with
only minor changes into the Companies Act 1929 ("1929
Act")."° Both the President and the Securities Act's principal
' See Brandeis, Other People's Money at 92-108 (cited in note 99).
13 Samual I. Rosenman, compiler, 1 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 667 (Random House, 1938) ("Roosevelt Papers").
'o Id at 682.
10 The discussion in this paragraph and the next draws on Seligman, The Transfor-
mation of Wall Street at 1-100 (cited in note 99).
1" 19 & 20 Geo 5, ch 23 (1929).
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draftsman, James Landis, identified the 1929 Act as the model
for the Securities Act.
117
Convenience undoubtedly explains in part why the Securities
Act borrowed so heavily from the 1929 Act, notwithstanding the
latter's narrow focus. The Roosevelt administration's broader
goal, identified in the Democratic Party platform, was to bring
the New York Stock Exchange under direct federal regula-
tion.' It was understood, however, that this task would be
difficult: the Stock Exchange had made clear its absolute opposi-
tion to governmental oversight, and the Roosevelt administration
was still undecided about what form of oversight it wanted. But
after the President's early success in dealing with the bank crisis,
he decided to introduce some securities legislation immediately,
while public support was high, and to leave the more time-con-
suming stock exchange bill for later."9 The 1929 Act model pro-
vided a convenient means of satisfying Roosevelt's desire to have
a law enacted immediately.
The use of the 1929 Act as a model was not purely a matter
of convenience, however. As the above discussion of the 1932
election campaign indicates, Roosevelt had something along the
lines of the English statute in mind for some time. A disclosure
law based on the 1929 Act had additional attractions. Although it
would be a significant extension of federal authority, substantive-
ly it would represent (as in England) only an incremental change
from existing common law standards. Congress was also con-
cerned that any attempt to address agency problems other than
through disclosure might be unconstitutional."0 Basing the Se-
curities Act on the 1929 Act also allowed supporters to point out
that these disclosures had not harmed the English markets and
were therefore not likely to harm the American markets."' Fi-
nally, by making underwriters' and promoters' compensation the
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, 2 Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin
D. Roosevelt 347-48 (Da Capo, 1972); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo Wash L Rev 29, 34 (1959).
108 See Rosenman, compiler, 1 Roosevelt Papers at 667 (cited in note 103).
10 See Thel, 42 Stan L Rev at 416 (cited in note 100).
110 See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
Vand L Rev 1129, 1181-82 (1993).
.. See Provide for the More Effective Supervision of Foreign Commercial Transac-
tions, S Rep No 41, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1933), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar,
compilers, 2 Legislative History Item 16 at 2 (cited in note 99) ("Long since, in England,
the Government has endeavored to protect the purchasers of securities and it has succeed-
ed by an act very similar to that here presented. The drastic provisions of the English
securities law have not hampered honest investments .. ").
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focus of the "disclosure bill," the administration could be seen as
attacking Wall Street rather than the business community gener-
ally.
The administration and Congress had an alternative model
of new-issue regulation to consider. Virtually every state had a
state securities, or "Blue Sky," law in 1933. Those laws required
sellers of nonexempt securities to file disclosure documents with
a state official prior to any offers or sales." Compared to the
1929 Act, the disclosure items specified in the Blue Sky laws
tended to be less concerned with the promoter problem and more
concerned with the prospects and value of the business itself.
Typical disclosure items included a business plan,"' a schedule
of the issuer's assets and an appraisal,"' abstracts of title to
real estate owned by the issuer,"' a schedule of insurance car-
ried," 6 and even a statement of "all material facts ... relative
to the character or value of such securities."" These notions
could not have been derived from the English precedents, for
such disclosures were not a feature of English law. The distinc-
tive features of the disclosures mandated by Blue Sky laws, how-
ever, reflected the distinctive purposes of those laws, purposes
that were not shared by the federal statutes.
Most of the Blue Sky laws of that era provided for so-called
"merit review," or a substantive review of the quality of the secu-
rity." Although individual statutes varied widely, the typical
one charged a state official with examining the information fied
and any other information the official chose to require. The secu-
rities could be sold only with the official's permission, which was
to be granted only if the official concluded that the business and
the offering met specified standards: for example, the issuer's
112 For a detailed discussion of Blue Sky laws, see Louis Loss and Edward M. Cowett,
Blue Sky Law (Little, Brown, 1958).
"' See, for example, Ark Stat § 8418k (1921 & Supp 1927); Idaho Code Ann § 25-1602
(1932).
..4 See, for example, Ill Rev Stat ch 32, ST 262(6), 263 (Cahill 1933); Comp Stat Neb §
81-5405 (1930).
" See United States Department of Commerce, A Study of the Economic and Legal
Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act, in Securities Act, Hearings on S 875 before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 312, 321 (1933)
("Senate Hearings"), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 2 Legislative History
Item 21 at 312, 321 (cited in note 99).
11' See id.
.. Va Code § 3848(51)(f) (1930). See also Rev Stat Kan § 17-1228(6) (1923 & Supp
1933) ("all knowledge or information... relative to the character or value of such securi-
ties or of the property or earning power" of the issuer).
118 See Loss and Seligman, 1 Securities Regulation at 107-122 (cited in note 78).
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business was "sound," the terms of the offering were "fair," or the
price of the securities would permit a "fair return."" While
these statutes were poorly drafted and economically naive, their
purpose was clear-to curtail the sale of high-risk securities."9
Part of the underlying motivation for the Blue Sky laws, like the
"watered stock" doctrine, was a deep suspicion of companies that
had a significant amount of intangible assets.2
The more astute strategists within the Roosevelt administra-
tion recognized the crudeness of the Blue Sky approach. Early in
the process of drafting the Securities Act, the administration
considered and rejected merit review in favor of a pure disclosure
statute,' as did Sam Rayburn, the chairman of the House com-
' See, for example, Idaho Code Ann § 25-1605 (1932) (business and terms of sale
must be "fair" and "promise a fair return on the stock"); Rev Stat Mo § 7730 (1929)
(business may not be "based upon unsound business principles"). Some statutes also
contained conditions that targeted the promoter problem. See, for example, Comp Stat
Neb § 81-5408 (1930) (no approval if the company is "a mere scheme of a promoter or pro-
moters to obtain money or property at the expense of the purchasers" of the security); Va
Code § 3848(58) (1930) (same).
12' The statutes typically required full registration and merit review only for a re-
sidual class of securities, defined by removing various categories of blue-chip or invest-
ment-grade securities. See, for example, Ill Rev Stat ch 32, 256 (Cahill 1933) (placing
securities into four categories, the residual category, "Class D," being described as those
"based on prospective income").
Macey and Miller argue that the attempt to stop the sale of "speculative" securities
was led by small banks and savings institutions that sought to suppress competition for
depositors' funds from high-risk companies that could offer a high expected return. Jona-
than R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex L Rev 347,
351, 365-67 (1991).
1 See, for example, Ala Code § 9886 (1929) (securities commission must order an
appraisal if a "material part" of the issuer's assets consists of intangibles); Ark Stat Ann §
8418m (1921 & Supp 1927) (no more than 20 percent of capital may represent intangibles,
and securities commission may require that any securities issued in return for intangibles
be put in escrow); Ill Rev Stat ch 32, T 265 (any securities of Class D company issued in
return for intangibles must be put in escrow; escrow agreement must provide that such
securities will rank behind all other securities of corporation in event of bankruptcy or
liquidation); Va Code § 3848(49)(c) (1930) (including in list of securities subject to full
registration those of issuers with a material amount of intangibles).
1 See Message from the President-Regulation of Security Issues, 77 Cong Rec S 937
(Mar 29, 1933), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 1 Legislative History Item
3 at 937 (cited in note 99):
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which
they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securi-
ties to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public.
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mittee with jurisdiction over the securities bill. 3 It seems en-
tirely plausible to speculate that the President and Congress re-
garded substantial disclosures about an issuer's business and
properties to be part and parcel of merit review, and thus inap-
propriate for a pure disclosure statute. This is all the more likely
given the evidence that "full disclosure" was to Roosevelt a short-
hand for disclosure of underwriters' commissions.
C. Does Agency or Accuracy Enhancement Better Explain the
Statutes?
This Section looks in more detail at the design of the manda-
tory disclosure system in the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act and argues that the design is more consistent with the agen-
cy approach than the accuracy enhancement approach.
Congress's extensive borrowing from English law is an important
piece of evidence in favor of the agency approach. However, Con-
gress added a number of features to the mandatory disclosure
system that were not a part of English law, and some of these
appear to move in the direction of accuracy enhancement. I will
argue, however, that these additional features can also be under-
stood, and perhaps better understood, as responding to agency
concerns. Thus, on balance the evidence supports the agency ap-
proach.
1. Statutory design as evidence of the agency approach.
The substantive provisions of the Securities Act retain the
1929 Act's focus on the promoter problem. Both statutes contain
a schedule that lists the information to -be disclosed. With a few
exceptions, the items specified in Schedule A to the Securities
Act' deal with the financial interests of promoters, underwrit-
ers, officers, directors, and controlling persons and with the use
of the issue's proceeds. The House committee that drafted the bill
23 The first bill introduced by Rayburn was an amalgamation of the 1929 Act and the
Blue Sky laws, and provided for merit review. See Federal Securities Act, HR 4314, 73d
Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 29, 1933), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 3 Legisla-
tive History at Item 22 (cited in note 99); Federal Securities Act, Hearing on HR 4314
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 9
(1933) (statement of Huston Thompson, draftsman of HR 4314) ("House Hearings"),
reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 2 Legislative History Item 20 at 9, 11, 44-
45 (cited in note 99). Rayburn, after discussions with the Roosevelt administration, jet-
tisoned that bill and accepted a substitute prepared by James Landis, Benjamin Cohen,
and Thomas Corcoran. See Landis, 28 Geo Wash L Rev at 30-33 (cited in note 107).
12 15 USC § 77aa, Schedule A (1988).
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referred to the disclosure provisions as "designed to reach items
of distribution profits, watered values, and hidden interests that
usually have not been revealed to the buyer despite their indis-
pensable importance in appraising the soundness of a securi-
ty."' Nearly one-half of the thirty-two items specified in
Schedule A overlap in whole or in part with the nineteen items
contained in the Fourth Schedule to the 1929 Act. 6 It is equal-
ly instructive to note what is not included in Schedule A. There is
a remarkable paucity of information about the issuer's business,
other than its financial results. The only item that requires a de-
scription of the company's business is item (8), which calls simply
for disclosure of "the general character of the business transacted
or to be transacted." 7 The contrast with modern disclosure
standards could not be more stark. The SEC's current disclosure
requirements call for a detailed description of the issuer's busi-
ness, its properties, and any significant legal proceedings involv-
ing it; the description of what must be disclosed runs to six pages
in the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 The current disclosure
system stands the statute on its head by making disclosures
about the company's operations the cornerstone of the sys-
tem. 9
In general, the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act are
not at all concerned with management's attempts to further the
interests of shareholders. They do not require discussion of the
company's day-to-day operations, its properties, its competitive or
regulatory environment, or the views of its management about
the company's financial performance. Any student of securities
regulation is aware that such matters occupy a great deal of the
SEC's attention. If one compares a modern prospectus, which is
' Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce,
HR Rep No 85, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 7 (1933), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, compil-
ers, 2 Legislative History Item 18 at 7 (cited in note 99).
126 Compare 15 USC § 77aa, Schedule A, with Companies Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, ch
23, Fourth Schedule. In particular, items (20), (22), and (24) of Schedule A closely resem-
ble, both in substance and wording, items 12, 15, and 13, respectively, of the Fourth
Schedule. In addition, items (4), (9), (13) and (15)-(17), (14), (18), (19), and (21) of Schedule
A are similar in greater or lesser degrees to items 4, 16, 5, 3, 11, 10, and 8, respectively,
of the Fourth Schedule.
"' 15 USC § 77aa, Schedule A, item (8).
See 17 CFR § 229.101-.103 (1994).
See also Item 303, 17 CFR § 229.303 (1994), which calls for "[m]anagement's
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations," and Item 503(c),
id § 229.503(c), which for certain issuers requires disclosure of "the principal factors that
make the offering speculative or one of high risk." Schedule A contains nothing remotely
comparable to either Item.
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jammed full of details on every aspect of the company's business,
with Schedule A, the two barely seem related.
Congress understood that Schedule A did not cover every bit
of information that an investor might want and an issuer might
disclose. The Securities Act explicitly contemplates that the man-
dated information would constitute only part of a new-issue pro-
spectus.' Investors would of course expect, and issuers would
provide, information about the business of the issuer as well. The
statute permits, but does not require, the SEC to regulate that
additional information. The statute does, however, provide reme-
dies for materially false or misleading statements and includes a
broad prohibition on fraud.''
Sophisticated contemporaries recognized that the Securities
Act was functionally similar to the 1929 Act. There is little doubt
that informed observers in 1933 regarded the Securities Act as a
very conservative, incremental step. 1 2 Felix Frankfurter re-
ferred to the Securities Act as a "belated and conservative at-
tempt to curb the recurrence of old abuses."" William Douglas
belittled the Securities Act just after its passage as a "nineteeth-
century piece of legislation" unresponsive to the great changes in
industrial organization that in his view required more compre-
hensive governmental oversight of capital allocation.'" The leg-
islation instead responded to a set of problems that existed well
before the 1920s. It did so by substantially replicating an English
solution that, in itself, drew heavily on accepted agency law.
The Exchange Act expanded the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem to include ongoing, periodic disclosure by listed compa-
nies.' 5 Although Congress extended disclosure beyond the pro-
motional stage, the principal consequence was to require ongoing
'" Section 10 of the Securities Act provides that a prospectus must contain the in-
formation contained in the registration statement, with certain exceptions, along with any
additional information that the Commission (initially the Federal Trade Commission,
later the SEC) requires. 15 USC § 77j(a), (c). The required information must be "placed in
a conspicuous part of the prospectus and.., in type as large as that used generally in the
body of the prospectus," id § 77j(e), thus showing that Congress contemplated that the
required information would only be a portion of the prospectus. Indeed, the language
seems to suggest that Congress assumed that the required information would be only a
minor part of a prospectus.
.1 Id §§ 771(2), 77q.
'" See Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 71-72 (cited in note 99), which
cites the sources used here.
13 Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, Fortune 53 (Aug 1933).
134 William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 Yale Rev 521, 529 (1934).
1 The reporting requirement was extended to most publicly-held over-the-counter compa-
nies in 1964. See 15 USC § 781(g).
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disclosure of management's compensation and self-dealing trans-
actions as well as financial information. The Exchange Act sim-
ply added a limited set of manager/shareholder agency problems
to the promoter problem as appropriate subjects for mandatory
disclosure. 3 ' Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act'. provides a
list of items to be disclosed. Like Schedule A, the twelve items
set out in Section 12(b) include only a bare requirement for the "na-
ture of the business,"" but call for comprehensive information
about officers, directors and principal shareholders and their
compensation and dealings with the corporation.3 9 Section
12(b) thus retains Schedule A's resemblance to the English dis-
closure system. Interestingly, one of the most detailed provisions
of Section 12(b) repeats Schedule A's requirement to disclose
"material contracts," using language very similar to that of the
1900 Act, and reflecting the concerns about self-dealing that had
influenced every disclosure statute since 1867.'
The Exchange Act was a more significant regulatory innova-
tion than the Securities Act. It is not simply a disclosure statute,
but imposes significant and far-reaching substantive regulation
on the securities industry. However, it is interesting to note that
other Exchange Act provisions also show Congress's concern for
manager/shareholder agency problems. Section 14(a)," which
gives the SEC the authority to regulate proxy solicitation, was
likely the result of congressional concern for management's mis-
use of the proxy machinery.' 2 Even Section 16,' which deals
with trading in the company's equity securities by officers, direc-
tors, and controlling shareholders, may have been prompted by
agency cost concerns.'" Section 16 regulates these transactions
" This was more controversial than the Securities Act's disclosure provisions because
it impinged more closely on the states' authority over corporate governance.
, 15 USC § 781.
12 Exchange Act § 12(b)(1)(A), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(A).
' See id § 12(b)(1)(D), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(D) (executive compensation); id §
12(b)(1)(E), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(E) (compensation to other highly-compensated employeeg);
id § 12(b)(1)(F), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(F) (bonus and profit-sharing plans); id § 12(b)(1)(G), 15
USC § 781(b)(1)(G) (management and service contracts).
140 Id § 12(b)(1)(I), 15 USC § 781(b)(1)(I) (material contracts not in the ordinary course
of business).
141 15 USC § 78n(a).
142 See Fisch, 46 Vand L Rev at 1189 (cited in note 110).
15 USC § 78p.
" See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly
Held Companies, 42 Hastings L J 393, 399 (1991) (a significant purpose of Section 16 was
to "mov[e) the interest of those who control corporations into alignment with the interest
of stockholders").
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partly by forcing insiders to disclose their trades.
2. Statutory design as evidence of the accuracy enhancement
approach.
Notwithstanding the basic similarity between the Securities
Act and the 1929 Act, and more particularly between the disclo-
sure schedules, the Securities Act has a broader scope. It envi-
sions a more intrusive form of regulation (the disclosures must be
filed with, and may be reviewed by, the SEC prior to their use in
a prospectus), and the disclosure schedule is more extensive. The
Securities Act also gives the SEC the authority to prescribe addi-
tional or different disclosure items. Did Congress accordingly
intend or foresee a disclosure system closer to the accuracy en-
hancement model than to the agency cost model?
The leading historian of the federal securities laws has ar-
gued that by virtue of the additional disclosure items, Schedule A
more closely resembles the disclosure obligations contained in the
New York Stock Exchange's listing standards than those con-
tained in the 1929 Act.' If so, then the Securities Act is not
just targeted at the promoter problem. The disclosure require-
ments of the New York Stock Exchange in 1933 were concerned
not only with agency problems, but also with the issuer's busi-
ness and ongoing operations. The listing requirements, for exam-
ple, called for information about the company's properties, its
operations, and its financial position." The Stock Exchange
was, within limits, pursuing a "full disclosure" ideal. 47
One can take two different views of the relationship between
Schedule A and the Stock Exchange's listing requirements. On
the one hand, Congress included more in Schedule A than was in
the 1929 Act, and the new items came largely from the Stock
Exchange's listing requirements. One might conclude, therefore,
that it was Congress's intent to bring the entire range of informa-
tion relevant to pricing a security out of the realm of voluntary
disclosure and into a mandatory system. On the other hand, one
might note that Congress failed to include in Schedule A much of
See Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 46 (cited in note 99).
" The pre-1933 New York Stock Exchange listing requirements are reprinted in J.
Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange 549-83 (Ronald Press, rev ed 1930).
147 Those disclosure requirements lend some credence to the argument that whatever
benefits mandatory disclosure provides can be obtained through private arrangements
without incurring the design problems that plague a government-run disclosure system.
See Part lV.B.
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what is contained in the listing requirements. One could argue,
therefore, that Congress did not understand Schedule A as a
dramatic expansion of the 1929 Act's disclosure system.
The latter seems the stronger argument. What Congress took
from the listing requirements falls basically into two categories.
The first is information about the formal rights attaching to the
security, and the relative position of the security vis-a-vis other
equity and debt claims on the company.' The second is an audit-
ed balance sheet and income statement.49 Both are consistent
with the agency focus of the English statutes. In contrast, the
elements of the listing requirements that Congress chose to omit
are unambiguously related to company value. The omitted infor-
mation includes descriptions and data concerning principal prop-
erties, output, employees, and franchises: in short, virtually all of
the listing information related directly to the company's opera-
tions (other than its financial statements). Put in context, the
dividing line between what is included in the Securities Act's
mandatory system and what is not supports the agency cost ex-
planation.
a) Information about capital structure. Schedule A, like
the listing requirements, calls for detailed information about the
characteristics of the security and its place in the issuer's capital
structure." This information can be vital to understanding the
financial interests of promoters. The rights and obligations of a
security holder are defined by the express and implied contract
between that holder, the issuer, and the other security holders.
At the promotional stage, the other security holders likely in-
clude the promoter and/or associates of the promoter. Judging
from reported cases, American promoters appear to have taken
their profit less in the form of cash and more in the form of stock
than their English counterparts.' 5 ' Incoming shareholders could
not, therefore, have understood the financial interests of the pro-
moter without understanding the rights and obligations attached
to the outstanding securities.
' See 15 USC § 77aa, Schedule A, items (9)-(12).
' See id, items (25)-(26).
See note 148.
"' To the extent stock watering cases involved claims by other equity holders, as op-
posed to creditors, the claim typically was that the promoter had caused the company to
issue stock to himself on terms more favorable than those offered the other shareholders.
See Macey and Miller, 70 Tex L Rev at 355 (cited in note 120).
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The solution to that problem in the nineteenth century, both
in England and America, was simple. Corporate stock was turned
into a standardized commodity so that little specific disclosure
about its attributes was needed. Capital structures typically
contained only one class of stock and often contained no long-
term debt at all.152 Stockholders typically purchased their stock
at the promotional stage at a price equal to par. When subse-
quent sales of stock were made, the common law provided a pre-
emptive right to the existing shareholders.' As Berle and
Means described it, nineteenth-century corporate law "authorized
a specific capital structure, and the place of each shareholder in
this capital structure was carefully defined. " 1' A share was
thus very similar to an interest in a partnership, except by virtue
of its transferability and limited liability.
By the end of the nineteenth century, this rigidity was
breaking down in England as promoters tried new methods of
extracting their profit from the flotation. An emerging practice
was to create and issue to the vendors "founders' shares," or
"managers' shares," having different rights than those attaching
to the ordinary shares. 5 The 1900 Act accordingly required
disclosure of the number of such shares and the rights that at-
tached to them.'56 Thus, the Securities Act's requirement to dis-
close capital structure represents less of an innovation than it
might appear.
In the United States by the 1930s, private ordering had
replaced legislative mandate with respect to capital structure and
the relative place of each investor. Corporate codes permitted no-
par stock beginning in the 1910s." 7 Some states permitted a
corporate charter to remove preemptive rights.' Greater pow-
ers were provided to alter terms of the charter and to create new
classes of securities.'59 The ability of an issuer to custom-tailor
its capital structure increased substantially between 1900 and
1933, and investors consequently had an increased need to obtain
I"2 See Jefferys, Business Organization in Great Britain at 216, 242-43 (cited in note
24) (little use of preferred stock or debt securities prior to 1880s).
" This was established in the United States by Gray v Portland Bank, 3 Mass 363,
383 (1807).
" Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 148 (Macmillan, 1933).
See Gore-Browne and Jordan, A Handy Book at 26-27 (cited in note 75).
' 63 & 64 Vict, ch 48, § 10(1)(a).
'7 See Smith, New Jersey Corporation Law at 30 (cited in note 97).
'u See Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 144-46 (cited in note 154).
i Id at 148-52.
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specific information about the capital structure and their pro-
posed place in it. The importance of that information to investors
was so great that it inevitably had to become subject to either
voluntary or mandatory disclosure, just like other information
regarding vendors' and promoters' financial interests.
b) Financial statements. The Securities Act required that
a registration statement contain an audited balance sheet and
income statement. The same items were required on an ongoing
basis under the Exchange Act. Although this requirement did not
appear in the 1929 Act's disclosure schedule, on balance it seems
consistent with the agency cost focus.
As to new-issue disclosure, Congress appears to have viewed
the financial statement requirement as part of the solution to the
promoter problem. The most persistent voice relating to account-
ing matters during the drafting and deliberation of the Securities
Act was that of Robert Healey, Federal Trade Commission gener-
al counsel and later SEC Commissioner. 6 ° Healey was a vigor-
ous proponent of historical cost accounting and was highly criti-
cal of public utilities that had written up their assets to increase
their rate base.'6 ' Healey got his way. Language he proposed
requiring that a registration statement contain a current balance
sheet showing "the nature and cost" of the issuer's assets was
included in the Securities Act.
62
Write-ups on balance sheets were closely related to the phe-
nomenon of stock watering, as described above. Stock watering
was, in practical effect, an early attempt at current value ac-
counting. Support for historical value accounting in the context of
promotional companies was merely another means of trying to
force disclosure of the price a promoter had paid for an asset.
160 See House Hearings, in Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 2 Legislative History
Item 20 at 228-48 (cited in note 99) (statement of Robert E. Healey); Senate Hearings, in
Ellenberger and Mahar, compilers, 2 Legislative History Item 21 at 211-26 (cited in note
99) (statement of Robert E. Healey).
16! The reformers' goals with respect to public utilities should not be lumped together
with those relating to ordinary industrial companies. Much of the regulatory concern with
utilities was to minimize the rates charged to their public customers. Disclosure regula-
tion with respect to utilities was intended in part to make the utilities' costs more trans-
parent to their regulators as a means of tightening rate regulation. It was for that reason
that candidate Roosevelt proposed more stringent securities disclosure requirements with
respect to utilities than he had proposed generally. See Rosenman, compiler, 1 Roosevelt
Papers at 737 (cited in note 103).
16 See House Hearings, in 2 Legislative History Item 20 at 235 (cited in note 99)
(statement of Robert E. Healey) (proposing language that became, with minor modifica-
tions, part of item (25) of Schedule A).
1084 [62:1047
Mandatory Disclosure
It seems likely that Congress had watered stock in mind
when it included the financial statement requirement in the
Securities Act." The growing use of no-par and low-par stocks
had made the watered stock doctrine less of a check on the pro-
moter, and historical value accounting was a substitute that
tended to force disclosure of the price a promoter had paid for
property if it had been recently acquired. The ultimate effect of
the financial statement requirement was not, therefore, much
different from that of the other disclosure requirements. The
balance sheet requirement forced a promoter who had recently
purchased the property he contributed to disclose the cost of the
property; the income statement requirement forced him to record
commissions, fees, and similar expenses. At the same time, the
Securities Act set the stage for the triumph of historical cost ac-
counting as the basis for periodic disclosure. While the decision
to embark on historical cost accounting has been much criticized,
it makes perfect sense if the objective of financial reporting is not
to help traders value firms, but merely to help shareholders un-
cover breaches of management's duties.
In the context of ongoing reporting, two distinct conceptions
of the function of financial reporting are possible. One might view
financial reporting as principally a form of monitoring for the
benefit of shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties.
Alternatively, one might view accounting as a means of providing
a comprehensive picture of a firm's performance that may enable
investors to form a better judgment of the value of the firm and
its securities. While today we tend to emphasize the latter func-
tion, the former would have loomed much larger in the early part
of the twentieth century.
The original purpose of accounting was to account-that is,
to show how money and property entrusted to an agent had been
used so that the principal could be assured that the agent had
acted for the principal's benefit rather than the agent's. 1' From
an early stage in their development, business associations of all
kinds were audited by representatives of the equity participants
for the purpose of identifying and recovering unauthorized or
self-interested expenditures by management." Such oversight
'" Seligman points to watered stock as an important part of the background for both
state and federal securities laws in the period 1911 to 1934. See Joel Seligman, The His-
torical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J Corp L 1, 18-19 (1983).
" See B.S. Yamey, Some Topics in the History of Financial Accounting in England,
1500-1900, in W.T. Baxter and Sidney Davidson, eds, Studies in Accounting 11, 11-12
(Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1977).
" See Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing and the
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by shareholders is a straightforward example of shareholder
monitoring of management, as described in the modern literature
on the theory of the firm.'66 The need for a formal system of
monitoring corporate expenditures increases as the number of
shareholders increases and their involvement in the operation of
the business decreases. It is therefore not surprising that an
accountant would use the phrase "severance of ownership and
control" in 1924 to describe the conundrum of the modern corpo-
ration, eight years before that concept entered the legal and
economic literature with the publication of Berle and Means' The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.'67
Early audits were carried out by a committee of sharehold-
ers, and later statutes continued to give the shareholders the
ultimate authority to name the auditors.168 That arrangement
makes clear the importance of the monitoring function. Even as
outside firms of professional auditors began to occupy the field in
the late nineteenth century, however, the focus on agency issues
continued.'69 In America, the point was underscored by the fact
that many of the early professional accountants were associated
with English firms and audited American companies that sold
securities in England.'7 ° The distant investors obviously wanted
someone whom they trusted to keep an eye on management's use
of the corporate assets. An important feature of the outside ac-
countant both then and now is "independence," which as an oper-
ational matter means that the auditors will report discovered
breaches of management's duties to the shareholders. 7'
c) The SEC's plenary authority. The hardest piece of
data to square with the agency cost explanation for the Securities
Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J L & Econ 613, 616-26 (1983).
"' Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ 323 (cited in note 5).
" Compare Henry Rand Hatfield, An Historical Defense of Bookkeeping, 37 J Acct
241, 251 (1924) ("In part the new significance of accounting is due to subdivision of
ownership and the severance of ownership and control so characteristic of the corporate
form of business organization."), with Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 4
(cited in note 154) (describing separation of ownership and control).
" See Watts & Zimmerman, 26 J L & Econ at 624 (cited in note 165). See also 19 &
20 Geo 5, ch 23, § 132 (1929) (providing for appointment of auditor at each annual general
meeting).
16 See Watts and Zimmerman, 26 J L & Econ at 628-33 (cited in note 165).
170 Id at 629-30. See also James Don Edwards, The Emergence of Public Accounting in
the United States, 1748-1895, 29 Acct Rev 52 (1954). Edwards states that the principal
function of late-nineteenth-century public accounting firms was to audit books "with the
object mainly of discovering or preventing irregularities." Id at 63.
Watts and Zimmerman, 26 J L & Econ at 615 (cited in note 165).
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Act is Congress's decision to give a regulatory agency broad au-
thority to expand or contract the disclosure system to the extent
the agency thinks necessary. The statute gives the SEC the au-
thority, when consistent with "the protection of investors," to
require disclosures in addition to those required by Schedule A
and to permit issuers to omit information required by Schedule
A." By providing this authority, it may be argued, Congress
intentionally sowed the seeds of the accuracy enhancement ap-
proach.
Yet the anomaly may be less stark than it appears. Congress
had already seen that the ability to create more complex capital
structures necessitated more disclosures than originally required
by Parliament in the 1900 Act. Similarly, there was no reason to
think that the techniques of company promotion would remain
static after 1933. It was natural, therefore, for a Congress that
placed substantial faith in administrative expertise to give au-
thority to an administrative agency to alter the disclosure system
as changing times required. 73 The relevant question, then, is
not whether Congress gave the SEC the formal authority to ex-
pand the focus of the mandatory disclosure system, but whether
that expansion was a wise use of the SEC's authority, a question
I address in the next Part.
d) Issuer strict liability. The Securities Act does not con-
sist simply of the registration and disclosure requirements. It
also contains liability provisions that make issuers, directors,
underwriters, and accountants, among others, liable for mislead-
ing statements or omissions in registration statements and pro-
spectuses. 74 The issuer itself is strictly liable for material in-
accuracies; other parties have affirmative defenses to the extent
they can show that they met specified levels of care. 75
Issuer strict liability seems anomalous if the statute, as I
have argued, was primarily a response to the promoter problem.
The purpose of issuer liability seems to be to increase the accura-
cy of information provided to the market, even at the cost of
forcing one group of investors to make up the losses of another.
1 15 USC § 77g. See also id § 77j(d) (SEC may prescribe contents of prospectuses).
" See Thel, 42 Hastings L J at 400 (cited in note 144); Thel, 42 Stan L Rev at 421-24
(cited in note 100). See also Ralph F. De Bedts, The New Deal's SEC: The Formative Years
81 (Columbia, 1964) (arguing that extensive delegation of authority to the SEC is a prin-
cipal source of strength of the federal securities laws).
m 15 USC §§ 77k, 771(2).
175 See id § 77k(b).
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Put in its original context, however, issuer liability is not incon-
sistent with the agency cost explanation.
Two remedies were available under the common law to a
purchaser of securities who relied on an inaccurate prospectus.
The first was to sue the directors for deceit. In Derry v Peek,76
the House of Lords concluded that fraudulent intent was neces-
sary to support an action against directors for a misleading pro-
spectus. Parliament responded to Derry v Peek by enacting the
Directors Liability Act 1890, which made directors liable for
misstatements in prospectuses even absent fraudulent intent.
7
The principal liability provision of the Securities Act, Section 11,
tracks the language of the Directors Liability Act very closely,
with the addition of issuer strict liability.78
Issuer liability essentially replicates the second remedy
available to a purchaser of securities under English law, which
was to rescind the purchase contract. 7 9 That remedy makes a
great deal of sense in the context in which it most typically
arose-the discovery of a misleading prospectus (often by virtue
of nondisclosure of the vendor's or promoter's financial interest)
shortly after the initial subscription for shares.8 0 The
shareholders' hope was to recover money paid for shares before
the money could flow out to the promoter and/or vendor. Had the
money already gone, the company itself could try to recover from
the promoter and vendor. As a fiduciary for the company, the
promoter was subject to an order for rescission. The vendor was
often involved sufficiently in the creation of the company to be
found a "promoter" as well, thus making the purchase price re-
coverable from him too.
The Securities Act, like the 1929 Act, is not by its terms
limited to securities issues by promotional companies, so Section
11 can-and today usually does-operate to force one innocent
group of shareholders to make good the losses of another inno-
cent group. That possibility may not have impressed itself strong-
ly on Congress, however, given the history on which it drew.
176 14 App Cas 337, 343 (HL 1889) (Halisbury opinion).
177 53 & 54 Vict, ch 64 (1890).
178 15 USC § 77k.
'7' See, for example, Central Railway Co. v Kisch, 2 Eng & Irish App 99, 121 (1867)
(Chelmsford opinion).
"o See id at 100-07; Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App Cas 1218, 1218-
21 (HL 1878).
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IV. FROM AGENCY COSTS TO ACCuRACY ENHANCEMENT-AN
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The Securities Act and Exchange Act can, without straining,
be read to authorize a disclosure system in which only agency
information is mandated, and in which the remainder of corpo-
rate disclosure is left to private ordering, although subject to
liability for misleading statements. That is not what happened.
The SEC and the courts concluded that Congress had intended to
mandate disclosure of every piece of information an investor
might want to have in order to make a decision whether to in-
vest. Indeed, the alleviation of agency problems would later be
identified as an indirect benefit of the "full disclosure" philoso-
phy.18
1
In recent years, the SEC has used the language of efficient
markets to explain some of its disclosure initiatives. Over the
last twenty-five years, the SEC has carried out a variety of far-
reaching extensions of the disclosure system, including segment
reporting, management's discussion and analysis, a limited de-
gree of current value accounting, and an attempt to bring man-
agement projections into the mandatory disclosure system."2
Each of these has been justified in part by reference to the accu-
racy enhancement goal. Does this relegate the agency cost model
to the status of a historical curiosity?
I argue not, but on normative grounds. This Part examines
efficiency arguments in favor of the agency cost model and the
accuracy enhancement model, and concludes that efficiency con-
siderations weigh in favor of limiting mandatory disclosure to
agency information. For some readers, the above history by itself
will be suggestive. Agency cost disclosure serves a typical private
law function of providing, ex ante, a rule designed to facilitate a
particular form of bilateral contractual relationship by economiz-
ing on transaction costs. Accuracy enhancement disclosure, in
contrast, serves a typical regulatory function of coordinating,
both through ex ante rules and ongoing government oversight, a
myriad of interactions among a vast array of economic agents. It
is widely accepted among law-and-economics scholars that gov-
ernments can do a reasonably good job at the former. It is much
'"' See Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under
the '33 and '34 Acts 50-51 (Disclosure Policy Study, 1969) ("Wheat Report).
1' See Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure at 28-88 (cited in note
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more sharply debated whether governments can effectively per-
form the latter function.1"
A. Efficiency and Agency Information
It is common to analyze the efficiency of an implied contrac-
tual duty by asking whether most parties would likely choose the
rule if given an opportunity to bargain.'" Adopting this mode of
analysis, it is plausible that promoters, managers and investors
bargaining ex ante would choose a rule under which agency infor-
mation must be disclosed.
The relationship between a promoter and an investor bears a
family resemblance to other relationships in which fiduciary
duties arise, such as those between stockbrokers or real estate
brokers and their customers. The promoter often has (and en-
courages investors to believe he has) specialized knowledge con-
cerning the availability of unincorporated businesses that might
be profitably converted into corporate form, as well as expertise
in effecting the conversion. It is difficult for the investors to mon-
itor the promoter's performance. The investors are likely much
less well informed than the promoter about the availability of
comparable businesses for sale, or about the prices and other
terms of recent sales of privately held companies.
It would make sense for the investors to desire expert assis-
tance in identifying and purchasing privately held businesses,
and for promoters to provide such assistance. In this situation,
however, the investors would likely insist on something akin to a
duty of loyalty. Such a duty would help assure that the promoter
does not take advantage of his special expertise to obtain a profit
in excess of the compensation explicitly or implicitly agreed to by
the investors. This can be accomplished in a relatively straight-
forward manner by an obligation to disclose the existence and ex-
tent of conflicting interests. Faced with a promoter who discloses
a substantial adverse interest, most investors would refuse to in-
vest unless they were assured that someone-either a knowledge-
able and independent board of directors or a sophisticated "lead"
183 A brief but informative intellectual history of the antiregulation movement appears
in George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" De-
bate, 36 J L & Econ 289, 289-95 (1993).
'" See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J L & Econ 425, 426-27 (1993); Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va L Rev 967, 971
(1983).
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investor with a large sum at stake-was going to negotiate the
terms on which the corporation would be willing to purchase the
promoter's property and services. The disclosure rule is therefore,
in Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's phrase, "contract-
inducing."" It encourages the creation of the promoter/investor
relationship, notwithstanding the promoter's potentially
conflicting interests, by forcing the promoter to negotiate the
terms of the self-interested transaction.
This duty is light compared to those imposed on other sorts
of fiduciaries. Moreover, the duty is in the promoter's interest
because it facilitates contracts under which promoters hire out
their expertise to investors, thereby creating an additional means
of profiting from that expertise. A promoter who purchases a
property for resale and does not wish to disclose his purchase
price can sell the business to a company with which he has no
fiduciary relationship. Alternatively, he can seek equity financing
from private sources, such as institutional investors, rather than
the general public. Thus, a duty of disclosure does not eliminate
the ability to profit from investing in information, as it might in
some circumstances.' Instead, disclosure makes possible an
alternative contractual relationship under which the promoter
sells his expertise to investors. To "sell" the expertise implies
that the principal, not the fiduciary, is entitled to all of the mar-
ginal gains from the fiduciary's effort. But the fiduciary is free ex
ante to seek a different type of relationship that divides the gains
in a different manner."' He may not, however, create a mis-
taken expectation on the part of investors that they will be the
beneficiaries of the promoter's expertise.
Requiring disclosure of executive compensation and self-deal-
ing on an ongoing basis may also make sense. The benefits of
such disclosure to the managers themselves are substantial. Just
as the disclosure requirement imposed on promoters takes the
place of the more intrusive duties of loyalty imposed on some
other fiduciaries, so the manager's duty to disclose compensation
'' See Easterbrook and Fischel, 36 J L & Econ at 444 (cited in note 184).
' See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law
of Contracts, 7 J Legal Stud 1 (1978) (suggesting that the absence of broad disclosure
rules in contract law encourages the search for socially valuable information by giving the
possessor of such information the option to deal with other parties without yielding his
informational advantage).
18 For a discussion of different ways of rewarding an agent and the incentives created
thereby, see Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers,
Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents'Rewards, 36 J L & Econ 503 (1993).
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and self-dealing is a substitute for more stringent substantive
limits on compensation and self-dealing. Corporate law permits
managers to set their own compensation and engage in self-deal-
ing transactions.'88 Good arguments can be made that share-
holders and managers would bargain to these permissive rules,
but it is also plausible that shareholders would want to know the
extent to which managers use this leniency.
But is it necessary to require specific disclosures? If both the
market for capital and the market for managerial services are
highly competitive, and if shareholders have rational expecta-
tions, then managers bear the losses caused by their self-interest-
ed behavior.'89 Under those assumptions, promoters and man-
agers have a strong incentive to take credible steps to reduce
agency losses. To the extent that agency costs can be reduced by
disclosure of agency information, promoters and managers will
voluntarily provide whatever information investors desire, so
long as the cost of production is less than the associated reduc-
tion in agency costs.9
Under the right assumptions, therefore, a legal rule mandat-
ing disclosure of agency information is unnecessary. At the same
time, it is likely that the costs of such a rule are not much great-
er than the costs associated with voluntary disclosure, and they
may even be less. Like many legal rules, a mandatory disclosure
rule will be efficient if it saves parties from negotiating over the
content of disclosure where the outcome is not likely to vary
among firms, and thus the costs of complying with the one-size-
fits-all rule are less than the costs of negotiating individual levels
of disclosure.'9'
It is quite plausible that a mandatory disclosure rule would
have exactly that result. The strongest case for the Securities
Act's disclosure system is that it specified a limited and well-
defined set of disclosures that virtually all firms would be expect-
ed to adopt. We know that, even prior to mandatory disclosure,
experienced investors demanded and received information relat-
'' Under Delaware law, for example, a transaction between a director and the corpo-
ration is valid if either the disinterested board members or the shareholders approve it
after disclosure of the "material facts" of the director's interest, or alternatively if the
transaction is objectively fair to the corporation. 8 Del Code Ann § 144(a) (1991).
1 See Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 318-19 (cited in note 5).
See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in Franklin R. Edwards, ed, Issues in
Financial Regulation 177, 189 (McGraw-Hill, 1979).
"1 See id at 192 ("Even if disclosure regulation does nothing more than require the
disclosure of information that firms currently disclose, it might be beneficial!").
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ing to promoters' and managers' self-dealing and other forms of
compensation. For example, the rules of the London Stock Ex-
change in the late nineteenth century permitted the listing of
promotional companies only if the prospectus "states the amount
paid, or to be paid, in money or otherwise, to concessionaires,
owners of property, or others on the formation of the company
[and the company authorizes] a member of the Stock Ex-
change... to give full information as to the formation of the
undertaking."'92 Similarly, investors in any new venture would
want to know what their ownership interest and formal rights
would be relative to those of other classes of shareholders. Rules
mandating disclosure of such information replicate, at lower cost,
a hypothetical bargain among investors and promoters.
One objection to this analysis is that it demonstrates only
that disclosure is an appropriate default rule. The Securities Act
disclosure system, however, is not merely a default rule, the
objection continues; its provisions cannot be waived.'93 The ob-
jection is well-taken in theory, although it seems insignificant as
a practical matter. Self-dealing and other forms of excessive com-
pensation can have such a substantial impact on investors' re-
turns that we would expect opting out to be very rare. ' More-
over, those investors most likely to waive the disclosure
rule-wealthy, sophisticated investors who do not need to rely on
the promoter's expertise-can opt out of the disclosure system by
purchasing securities in private placements.'95 And, of course,
promoters may opt out by selling to a genuinely independent en-
tity, thus avoiding the fiduciary relationship. Mandatory disclo-
sure may therefore function more like a default rule than it ap-
pears at first glance.
B. Efficiency and Accuracy Enhancement
The majority of promoters, managers, and shareholders
might agree to disclosure of agency information. Would they go
London Stock Exchange Rule 136, reprinted in 1895 Report at 262 (cited in note
30).
l See 15 USC § 77n.
A nonwaivable disclosure system can be analogized to other legal rules, such as the
Statute of Frauds, that invalidate some untainted contracts on the theory that the costs
created by invalidation are low compared to the benefits achieved through reduction in
hard-to-prove frauds. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal,
18 J L & Econ 293, 301-03 (1975).
" 15 USC § 77d(2) exempts from the registration (and therefore the mandatory
disclosure) requirements, "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
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beyond that and agree to disclosure of most or all information in
the promoters' or managers' possession relating to the value of
the firm? Let's begin by comparing accuracy-enhancing informa-
tion to agency information. Agency information is limited in
scope, can be described with reasonable precision, and is not
costly to produce; in addition, its relevance does not vary dramat-
ically among firms. None of these characteristics describes accu-
racy-enhancing information. The set of arguably relevant infor-
mation is vast. Not only is the sheer volume immense, but it is
difficult to specify ex ante what types of information are relevant
without engaging in overkill. The factors that are most important
to determining firm value vary substantially among firms. Thus,
any disclosure system will either require vast quantities of irrele-
vant disclosure from many firms or ignore what will be for some
firms the most important topics (or perhaps do both, as in the
current system). It is therefore relatively easy to replicate firm-
by-firm bargaining over disclosure of agency information through
a mandatory rule, but much more difficult to do so with respect
to accuracy-enhancing information.
The cost of gathering data relevant to stock price is also
higher than the cost of gathering agency information. The firm's
managers are well-informed about their own activities and con-
flicts of interest. In contrast, they may have to expend consider-
able effort to produce information that investors would want in
order to value the firm's securities. For example, assuming for a
moment that separate financial information about each line of
business and each geographic region is important to investors,
the same information may not be important to firm manag-
ers.9 It is surely plausible that managers of some firms would
not find it a useful exercise to attempt to allocate overhead ex-
penses among product lines or geographic regions, but do so only
because of the SEC's requirements. The same must also be true
of current value accounting. Managers do not typically pay to
have assets appraised on a periodic basis, so they must believe
that the managerial benefits of having that information do not
justify- the costs.
No one would dispute the fact that a disclosure system predi-
cated on accuracy enhancement is much more costly than one
1" The SEC requires for many businesses separate financial information about each
"business segment," or line of business, engaged in by the issuer, as well as for each
separate geographic region in which the issuer operates. See 17 CFR § 229.101(b), (d)
(1994).
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limited to a small amount of agency information. The argument
for the former must be that its social benefits are correspondingly
greater. The potential benefit is that a mandatory disclosure
system might cause new information to be reflected in market
prices more quickly or at less cost, or both, than a voluntary
disclosure system.
This argument in support of the accuracy enhancement mod-
el draws on a distinction between the private and social benefits
of information.'97 The argument runs as follows: information
relevant to the value of firms has social value that cannot be
fully captured by any one actor. This "public good" characteristic
implies that such information will be underproduced. Mandatory
disclosure is a means of collectivizing the cost of a collectively
valuable asset and solving the underproduction problem. At the
same time, accuracy-enhancing information enables the person
who first discovers it to make substantial profits. Accordingly,
much of the investment in information that occurs is duplicative
and, accordingly, wasteful. There can thus be both over- and
underinvestment in information, resulting from the gap between
private and social value. Mandatory disclosure helps close the
gap.
1. Mandatory disclosure as a cure for overinvestment.
One of the arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure of
accuracy-enhancing information is that it prevents or reduces
investment in information that has private value but no social
value. The argument stems from Jack Hirshleifer's demonstra-
tion that, under certain assumptions, the possessor of private
information can use it to make profitable trades even though the
information has no social value: that is, a single actor able to
capture the net social wealth created by the information would
not pay anything to have it. 9 ' The legal literature has seized
19, The argument that the gap between the private and social value of information
justifies the mandatory dislcosure system has been made most thoroughly by John Coffee,
see Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 725-34 (cited in note 2) (from which the summary in the text is
taken), but the idea has been around for some time. See, for example, Report of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities Exchange Commission,
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 626-28
(Committee Print 1977) (statement of William Beaver) ("Advisory Committee Report");
Nicholas J. Gonedes, Nicholas Dopuch, and Stephen H. Penman, Disclosure Rules, In-
formation-Production, and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure
Rules, 14 J Acct Res 89, 96 (1976).
"' See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 Am Econ Rev 561 (Pt 1 1971).
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on Hirshleifer's analysis to suggest that there may be excessive
investment by stock traders in information, because they can
reap private benefits that may exceed the social benefits.'
The implications of Hirshleifer's results for securities regula-
tion are both more limited and more complex than the legal liter-
ature indicates, for at least three reasons. First, Hirshleifer's
model follows the assumptions of classical price theory and as-
sumes that in a competitive market, any individual's trades do
not affect the market-clearing price.0 We know that this as-
sumption does not hold for securities markets because the prices
of trades in those markets convey information and thereby affect
the demand schedules of other traders. When prices reveal infor-
mation, the gap between the private and social value of that
information is reduced, and the problem of duplicative invest-
ment becomes self-correcting.' As more traders invest in infor-
mation, prices reflect that information, thus providing the infor-
mation to previously uninformed traders at no cost, which in turn
reduces the private incentive to gather additional information.
Indeed, were prices fully revealing (that is, if prices adjusted
instantaneously to new information), a gap would open in the
other direction-information could have social value even though
no trader could make a profit from investing in the informa-
tion. -2 0
2
Second, to the extent overinvestment exists, there are private
means of reducing it. The existence of market letters and other
types of research reports is evidence of voluntary coopera-
tion-some market participants produce reports and others pay
for them rather than compete for the same information.0 3 Oth-
er private arrangements, such as the New York Stock Exchange's
procedures for suspension of trading pending the announcement
and dissemination of material information,2 0 4 may serve to re-
duce the incentives for duplicative investments.
See Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 733-34 (cited in note 2); Easterbrook and Fischel, 70 Va
L Rev at 682 (cited in note 2). See also Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87
Mich L Rev 613, 702-03 (1988).
20 See Hirshleifer, 61 Am Econ Rev at 564 (cited in note 198).
20 See Sanford J. Grossman, The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expec-
tations and Informational Externalities, 44 Rev Econ Stud 431, 436 (1977); Jerry Green,
The Non-Existence of Informational Equilibria, 44 Rev Econ Stud 451, 453-54 (1977).
202 See Grossman, 44 Rev Econ Stud at 436 (cited in note 201).
See Gonedes, Dopuch, and Penman, 14 J Acct Res at 105 (cited in note 197).
See New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual 202.06-202.07 at 2-4 to
2-6 (1992).
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The third limitation is that Hirshleifer's analysis tells us
only that, where his assumptions hold, there will be too much
investment in information. This is not the same as saying that
public disclosure can eliminate this overinvestment. Where
Hirshleifer's result holds, disclosure is beneficial only if it re-
moves the incentive to make private investments-that is, if it
provides information to all traders before any one of them can
acquire it through other means. This is a very strong condition.
It is clearly not met under the present disclosure system. The
evidence is strong that the information in SEC reports cannot be
used to generate trading profits, which is to say that the market
is already efficient with respect to such information at the time it
is disclosed."0 5 This means that traders are routinely obtaining
information about company performance prior to the time it is
disclosed in SEC reports.
One might respond that the reason traders are able to obtain
the information prior to its formal disclosure is that management
does not try to keep the information secret because it knows the
information will eventually be disclosed. This observation is com-
pletely irrelevant, however, if the objective of disclosure is to
prevent duplicative investments in information. The fact that
prices already reflect the information contained in SEC reports
proves that substantial, and potentially duplicative, investment
in that information is taking place prior to the formal disclosure.
The argument that there would be less informal disclosure in the
absence of mandated disclosure may demonstrate that mandatory
disclosure cures underproduction of information (a point dis-
cussed below), but not overproduction.
Ultimately, traders will not invest in information if they
know that managers can take effective steps to keep the informa-
tion a secret. On the other hand, if traders know that informa-
tion can be obtained, they will devote money and effort to being
the first to obtain it. The fact that everyone else will get the
information at a designated time may create a greater sense of
urgency, but it does not remove the incentive to get the informa-
tion first.
Were we attempting to fix the disclosure regime to eliminate
investments in information prior to the time of its public disclo-
sure, we might make it illegal for corporate managers to make
' See Benston, 63 Am Econ Rev at 139 (cited in note 1) (concluding, based on prior
empirical work, that "[bly the time of the final (SEC-required) report, there is almost no
information that has not already been impounded in the price of the stock").
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private disclosures prior to the filing of public disclosure docu-
ments."' Such a policy would be both undesirable and unen-
forceable for two reasons. First, there is no obvious line between
"private disclosure" and the use of information for business pur-
poses. If a company's manager tells its principal supplier that the
company desparately needs raw materials to meet unexpectedly
strong demand for its product, this disclosure is in a sense pri-
vate because the supplier or its employees may decide to buy the
company's stock after they hear the information. At the same
time, the statement may help the company get needed supplies
more quickly. A rule forbidding such statements would be ridicu-
lously counterproductive, but absent such a rule, informational
asymmetries among traders (and accordingly overinvestment)
will continue to exist.
The second problem is that managers are not the only ones
who produce or obtain information about the company's perfor-
mance. Managers may be the only source, or the best source, of
some types of information, but a company's employees, suppliers,
competitors, and creditors, among others, also generate valuable
information about the company. It seems neither possible nor
desirable to tell all of these actors that they may not trade on the
information they generate, nor disclose it to others who might
trade, until the information is contained in a public disclosure
statement.
The alternative to forbidding private disclosure prior to the
time of public disclosure is to speed up the disclosure system to
the point where it is difficult to uncover the information prior to
the time it becomes public.0 7 The more quickly the information
reaches the public, the less time traders have to profit from the
information, and (perhaps) the less investment traders will make
in trying to beat the clock. That proposal is only superficially
attractive. As the speed of disclosure increases, its accuracy will
naturally decrease. The hours that accountants and lawyers now
' The SEC has made no serious effort to stop issuers from making disclosures
outside the scope of the prospectus to institutional investors, and has only sporadically
attacked managers for disclosing internal projections to analysts, despite its obvious
discomfort over both practices. See Tom Pratt, The IPO Information Gap, Investment
Dealers' Digest 15 (May 18, 1992); Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures
to Securities Analysts, 92 Colum L Rev 1517, 1530-31 (1992) (describing SEC action in
1991 against a corporate insider who made disclosures to analysts and suggesting that it
may show an SEC policy to discourage such disclosures).
' See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 Harv L Rev 747, 786-89 (1985) (suggesting that an electronic system of
"continuous disclosure" would reduce problems associated with private disclosure).
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routinely spend poring over disclosure documents to catch errors
prior to filing would be jettisoned. Private investments in verifi-
cation would become more profitable, because the first trader to
spot a mistake in the real-time disclosures might be able to profit
from the discovery. The focus of investment would therefore shift
from discovering information to discovering mistakes in the con-
tinuous flow of disclosures, but overinvestment would still exist.
Moreover, in stock trading, even very small increments of time
matter. In a speeded-up disclosure system, the competition to get
the information first would continue, but the sense of urgency
would be heightened. Traders might hire more assistants and
buy more computers to gather and analyze information more
quickly, and might purchase more expensive communications
systems to gather information as well as to transmit orders to
the trading markets more quickly than their competitors. It is
not obvious that the total amount invested in information would
decrease.
2. Mandatory disclosure as a cure for underinvestment.
Many of the observations made above with respect to
overinvestment apply to underinvestment as well. Capital mar-
kets help to narrow the gap between the private and social value
of information. While informational efficiency assures that pri-
vate value cannot be substantially greater than social value,
market inefficiency prevents too wide a gap from opening in the
opposite direction. Markets are just inefficient enough to make
gathering information a profitable activity."' The first trader to
obtain accurate information bearing on the value of a company
can capture some (but not all) of the trading profit to be had from
that information. We know, then, that traders have substantial
incentives to invest in information, and that many traders do so.
Some of the private institutional arrangements that correct for
the overinvestment problem can also correct for the
underinvestment problem. The voluntary collectivization of infor-
mation gathering through market letters and other reports serves
2' The theoretical case for profitable information arbitrage is made by Sanford
Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,
70 Am Econ Rev 393 (Pt 1 1980). For a consistent empirical result, see David F. Larcker
and Thomas Lys, An Empirical Analysis of the Incentives to Engage in Costly Information
Acquisition: The Case of Risk Arbitrage, 18 J Fin Econ 111 (1987).
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to create a property right in information that encourages its production.
Despite these corrective mechanisms, we might believe that
less information relevant to the value of firms would be produced,
absent mandatory disclosure. (The issue is not the sheer quantity
of data, but the amount of value-relevant information; if the
mandatory disclosure system produces information that is irrele-
vant to stock prices, it does not meet the efficiency criteria of the
accuracy enhancement model.) Because the disclosure system's
mandates are addressed principally to company managers, we
must further believe that, absent legal compulsion, those manag-
ers would effectively conceal information.
One shortcoming of this theory is that it views information
in firms as flowing primarily from the top down; if management
wishes, it can turn off the tap and less information will flow. This
is incorrect. Much, perhaps most, information within a firm flows
from the bottom up. Of course, information is collected, catego-
rized, and analyzed by management, and it is undoubtedly more
useful to traders having undergone that process. But the raw
data flows throughout the organization. Moreover, the data can-
not be contained within the company itself (even assuming that
the notion of the company as having discrete boundaries makes
any sense). Every sizeable company has thousands of interactions
vith other economic agents every day. It negotiates, buys and
sells, enters into contracts, borrows money, and makes and re-
ceives payments. These interactions convey information about the
company's performance.
Consider a manufacturing enterprise that suddenly experi-
ences a significant increase or decrease in orders. Its raw materi-
als suppliers will soon be aware of a change in the quantities of
raw materials the firm orders. Transportation companies will
notice a change in the quantity of deliveries to and pickups from
the firm's premises. The firm's labor unions will observe that the
number of employees is changing more than usual. The firm's
banks will notice changes in drawdowns on its working-capital
loan facility, as well as changes in the flow of cash through its
current account. Other suppliers of services to the firm, such as
travel agents and telecommunications companies, may observe
changes in the quantity of services consumed by the firm. These
effects will be evident in a matter of days, while the underlying
transactions would not show up in the company's periodic reports
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until the end of its current fiscal quarter, and possibly not until
the end of the current fiscal year."9
These pieces of information will not lie unnoticed, uncollect-
ed, and unused, given their potential value. Analysts and traders
are likely to talk to many of the above entities; the entities them-
selves, as well as their employees, may trade in the firm's stock.
Note also that the availability of this information is not a func-
tion of the mandatory disclosure system.210 It is created in a de-
centralized fashion and consequently cannot be easily concealed.
Any attempt at concealment would require greater centralization,
creating inefficiencies that would surely dwarf the gains to secre-
cy.
Anecdotes abound in the popular literature about clever
investors who make good predictions about a company's perfor-
mance from careful observation of generally available informa-
tion. "Adam Smith" tells a story about Warren Buffett's purchase
of a large stake in American Express just after that company's
stock declined sharply as a result of a financial scandal. 1 '
209 An increase or decrease in orders does not fit within any of the items that must be
reported currently on Form 8-K See Form 8-K, General Instructions, 5 Fed Secur L Rptr
(CCH) S 31,002 (Dec 21, 1994). At the end of the current quarter, the issuer would be
required to file financial information pursuant to Form 10-Q. The effect of the increase or
decrease may by that point be discernable from the financial statements. Form 10-Q also
calls for a "management's discussion and analysis" ("MD&A), and the increase or de-
crease in orders might constitute a "known trend" that must be disclosed in the MD&A_
See 17 CFR § 229.303 (1994). In any event, in the issuer's next annual report on Form 10-
K, the backlog of orders would be disclosed pursuant to Item 101(c)(viii) of Regulation S-
K 17 CFR § 229.101(c)(viii) (1994).
The observations made in the text do not depend critically on the company being
publicly traded at the time the events occur. Similar information would be available from
customers, suppliers, etc. of a company about to go public, and indeed we might expect
customers and suppliers to purchase in the offering in an attempt to profit from their
superior information.
210 Berle and Means's own description of the information available to the market in
1932 contrasts starkly with the notion that investors were largely in the dark prior to the
federal securities laws:
Unofficially the market has collected around itself a tremendous mechanism for col-
lection and dissemination of facts. These are made available through the standard
publications (Poor's, Moody's Standard Statistics) and at more frequent intervals
through the standard financial chronicles (as the Commercial and Financial Chroni-
cle, Annalist, Dun's Review); and in still more transitory form, through the financial
pages of the daily newspapers and certain papers which specialize in such matters
(Wall Street Journal, New York Commercial); and from moment to moment, through
the various ticker services. These, and many more besides, constantly pour into the
market a running narrative of facts, figures, amounts, opinion, and information of all
sorts ....
Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 294 (cited in note 154).
21 "Adam Smith," Supermoney 193 (Random House, 1972).
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Buffett went to a restaurant and counted the number of diners
who paid by American Express traveler's checks and concluded
that the company's core business was unaffected by the scandal;
he bought heavily and made a large return on the investment. A
popular book by an investment manager identifies appliance
repairmen as an important source of investment information
about companies selling consumer durables." Peter Lynch is
said to have invested in Dunkin Donuts stock in part because he
liked the coffee it served.213 Once again, this type of information
is simply too widely available to be concealed, even if managers
had some reason for wanting to conceal it.
We are nonetheless left with the fact that managers general-
ly have some information that is unavailable to the rest of the
market. The above analysis shows that this information is a
smaller percentage of the total information bearing on stock price
than it might at first seem, but nevertheless the information is
valuable. Absent a mandatory disclosure system, managers would
not have to share their deepest secrets with the rest of the mar-
ket. But this is true even under our current mandatory disclosure
system. As Edmund Kitch notes, the most plausible reason that
issuers rarely complain about the mandatory disclosure system is
that it does not require disclosure of anything sensitive.214 The
system focuses almost entirely on backward-looking, factual data
that is likely to be neither competitively sensitive nor easy to
conceal.
Consider some hypothetical examples of information that
might be in the possession of only a few employees and managers
and that would significantly affect the stock price. A pharmaceu-
tical company is on the verge of seeking a patent for a new drug.
A mining company has identified what it believes is a significant
ore body. Market research carried out by a large multinational
company suggests that introduction of its product in China could
increase worldwide sales by 25 percent. Each of these companies
could omit any mention of the development in its SEC filings
without violating the disclosure rules. 21 Indeed, as a practical
22 See John Train, The Money Masters 68-69 (Harper & Row, 1980).
213 See Carolyn Friday, A Superstar Bids Farewell, Newsweek 38 (Apr 9, 1990).
214 See Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure at 119 (cited in note 4).
213 Issuers filing a registration statement or periodic report are required to disclose
the existence of a new product, business, or geographic market only if it has been an-
nounced or otherwise made public. 17 CFR § 229.101(c)(ii) (1994). That provision goes on
to note that "Itihis paragraph is not intended to require disclosure of otherwise nonpublic
corporate information the disclosure of which would affect adversely the registrants corn-
1102 [62:1047
Mandatory Disclosure
matter, the risk involved in not revealing positive information is
extremely low. Outside the limited context of takeovers, a compa-
ny that experiences a sudden increase in stock price has little to
fear from the SEC or private litigants.216
This state of affairs could also be viewed as a mere design
flaw to be corrected. It is hard to imagine, however, that it would
be politically feasible to force companies to disclose competitively
sensitive information. A system that attempted to force such
disclosures, moreover, would be nearly impossible to enforce. The
annoying thing about secrets is that you can't prove they exist.
There is no effective way to make managers disclose what they
are thinking. The net effect of such an attempt would be that
fewer managers would commit their thoughts, beliefs, and plans
to writing in order to make it possible to deny that they had such
thoughts, beliefs, or plans.
This is not to say that management announcements never
contain new information. There is empirical evidence that man-
agement announcements of earnings, dividends, and stock splits
(which are typically made in advance of their reflection in SEC
filings) sometimes contain new information. 17 My argument is
simply that these particular management "secrets" have made it
into the mandatory disclosure system without a political battle
because managers have no desire to hide them. A company obvi-
ously cannot conceal the amount of dividends it pays or the fact
that it is splitting its stock. Disclosure of earnings was routine
for sizeable companies prior to 1933,21 and even companies in
lightly regulated markets such as Germany and Switzerland
announce earnings."9 It strains credulity to think that absent
petitive position."
216 Only a person who bought or sold the subject securities during the relevant time
period has standing to bring a private securities fraud action; a person who failed to pur-
chase because of misleadingly negative statements lacks standing. Blue Chip Stamps v
Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 737-38, 749 (1975). Although a person who sold in
response to a statement that turned out to be overly pessimistic could bring suit, the dif-
ficulty of proving damages appears to deter suit except in the takeover context, where the
tender offer or merger price provides a convenient benchmark for measuring damages.
217 See, for example, Richard J. Rendleman, Jr., Charles P. Jones, and Henry A.
Latan6, Empirical Anomalies Based on Unexpected Earnings and the Importance of Risk
Adjustments, 10 J Fin Econ 269 (1982); Joseph Aharony and Itzhak Swary, Quarterly
Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders' Returns:An Empirical Analysis,
35 J Fin 1 (1980); Guy Charest, Split Information, Stock Returns and Market
Efficiency-I, 6 J Fin Econ 265 (1978).
218 Benston found that all New York Stock Exchange listed firms disclosed net income
in each year from 1926 through 1934. George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC's Account-
ing Disclosure Requirements, 44 Acct Rev 515, 519-20 (1969).
219 See, for example, German Analysts Offer High Hopes for 1994, Fin Times 21 (Aug
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the mandatory disclosure system, publicly held United States
companies would cease making earnings, dividend, and split an-
nouncements.
C. Can Mandatory Disclosure Solve Any Other Problems?
It is worth noting the limitations of the arguments presented
in this Part. I have not attempted to analyze the consequences of
every possible mandatory disclosure rule. Rather, I have argued
that mandatory disclosure is a plausible solution to the limited
set of agency problems to which it originally was addressed, but
that it is not a good solution to the more general problem of in-
formational asymmetries among traders. This is not to say that
there might not be some other problem to which mandatory dis-
closure, appropriately designed, might be a solution."'
At the same time, the more things a disclosure system at-
tempts to do, the more substantial are the design problems facing
its authors. The virtue of the mandatory disclosure system as
initially developed in nineteenth-century England was that it
was simple and its effects were felt principally by a class of
firms-small, regional, newly-formed companies-for which the
danger of sharp promotional practice was traditionally great-
est.2 ' Neither of these observations is true with respect to the
current mandatory disclosure system in the United States. It is
accordingly no surprise that the system requires the production
of staggering amounts of information yet fails to achieve the
accuracy enhancement goal.
6-7, 1994) (discussing mid-year earnings reports of major German companies); Swiss Bank
Corp Falls to SFr 1.19bn in First Half, Fin Times 18 (Aug 17, 1994) (discussing mid-year
earnings reports of major Swiss banks).
220 One concern of the framers of the Exchange Act was market manipulation. It is not
universally accepted that manipulation of securities prices can be a profitable strategy.
Compare Daniel R. Fischel and David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in
Financial Markets?, 105 Harv L Rev 503, 512-23 (1991) (concluding that laws meant to
deter manipulation of securities prices are unnecessary because such manipulation is
hard to define and rarely profitable), with Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The
Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 Cornell L Rev 219, 221 (1994) ("the evidence in
the economic literature in fact indicates that manipulation is easier to accomplish than
Fischel and Ross admit"). One who believes that manipulation is a problem might support
a limited amount of disclosure of earnings and other significant performance data as a
means of reducing the ability of potential manipulators to use deceit in furtherance of
manipulation.
21 The United States securities laws ultimately dealt with such companies in a very
different way, largely by driving them out of the public markets and into the orbit of in-
stitutional investors. One might argue that this is a very sensible state of affairs; if so, it
could surely be achieved more directly and at less cost.
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V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGENCY COST MODEL
The accuracy enhancement model has affected disclosure
policy. The SEC's initial response to the efficient markets hypoth-
esis was to dismiss out of hand the notion that mandatory disclo-
sure was unnecessary in an efficient market.2 It soon became
obvious, however, that the language of efficient markets could be
used to support as well as attack the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem. Indeed, the essence of the accuracy enhancement model is
its justification of mandatory disclosure as part of the mechanism
by which markets become efficient.2" Accordingly, the SEC has
undertaken several disclosure initiatives that are consistent with
recommendations made by scholars who have employed the effi-
cient markets hypothesis.2" My description of these initiatives
will be brief, as they have recently been described in detail by
Kitch.2" My aim is to use these initiatives to contrast the policy
prescriptions of the agency cost model with those of the accuracy
enhancement model.
A. Disclosure of Projections
One of the earliest and most persistent uses of the theory of
efficient markets to criticize SEC disclosure policy dealt with
management projections. 6 There is nothing in the Securities
Act or Exchange Act that requires disclosure of management's
The SEC commissioned an Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. See
Securities Act Rel No 5673, 1976 SEC LEXIS 2516 (Feb 2) (noting that since the time of
the Wheat Report, "an increasing body of scholarly work," including the efficient markets
hypothesis, has evolved, "and penetrating questions have been asked concerning the costs
and benefits of the current system"). The Advisory Committee concluded that "notwith-
standing the arguments of economists and others that the efficient market hypothe-
sis... [has] rendered obsolete or unnecessary much or all of the mandatory disclosure
system... these arguments are not sufficiently compelling to justify dismantling the
existing system at this time." Advisory Committee Report at xlviii (cited in note 197).
' See, for example, Gilson and Kraakman, 70 Va L Rev at 569-70 (cited in note 3);
Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 747 (cited in note 2); Kahan, 41 Duke L J at 979-81 (cited in note
3).
'4 In addition to its use of the efficient markets hypothesis to justify the integrated
disclosure system, see discussion in text accompanying note 237, the SEC more recently
cited the efficient markets hypothesis in support of the design of the US-Canada
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System. See Securities Act Rel No 6841 (July 26, 1989), Fed
Secur L Rptr (CCH) 84,432 at 80,298 (1989 Transfer Binder).
' See Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure at 22-28 (cited in note
4).
" See, for example, Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 NYU L Rev 1151, 1197-1201 (1970); Benston, 63 Am Econ Rev at 137 (cited
in note 1).
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plans or projections, nor is there anything that prohibits it. From
the late 1930s until the late 1970s, however, the SEC had a poli-
cy against permitting the use of projections or other forward-
looking statements in a disclosure document, on the grounds that
unsophisticated investors might be misled by a departure from
purely factual information. 227 The critics noted that in an effi-
cient market, forward-looking information is much more valuable
than historical information, which is already impounded in
prices. After several rounds of proposals and comments, the SEC
adopted Rule 175 in 1979.2' Rule 175 provides a "safe harbor"
for certain forward-looking statements such as earnings projec-
tions and statements of management's plans or objectives. Such
statements are deemed not fraudulent so long as they are made
in good faith and with a reasonable basis.
The SEC explained the new rule by noting that "the avail-
ability of forward-looking and analytical information is important
to an investor's assessment of a corporation's future earning
power."' Taken at face value, however, the accuracy enhance-
ment model would take matters a step further. Disclosure of
management's views about the future should not merely be per-
mitted; it should be required, because those views are unques-
tionably an important piece of information that will affect the
stock price if made public. The SEC stopped well short of that
point. Its current stance is to "neither encourag[e] or discourag[e]
the making and filing of projections."23 ° However, it has recent-
ly announced its intention to reopen the question of disclosure of
projections, requesting comment, among other things, on whether
disclosure of projections should be mandated in some in-
stances." I
From the standpoint of the agency cost model, the current
stance is exactly correct. Disclosure of projections and other for-
ward-looking information has nothing to contribute to the resolu-
tion of the promoter problem or the problem of management's
self-interested use of the firm's assets. Such disclosures can
See Wheat Report at 96 (cited in note 181).
22 17 CFR § 230.175 (1994), adopted in Securities Act Rel No 6084 (June 25, 1979),
Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 82,117 (1979 Transfer Binder).
Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities
Act Rel No 5992 (Nov 7, 1978), Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 81,756 at 81,036 (1978 Transfer
Binder).
' Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Securities Act Rel No 5699
(Apr 23, 1976), Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 80,461 at 86,202 (1975-76 Transfer Binder).
"1 Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Rel No 7101 (Oct 13,
1994), Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 85,436 at 85,778 (1994-95 Transfer Binder).
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therefore be left unregulated. Investor demand for management
projections and the cost of making them (including competitive
losses) will determine the extent to which such projections are
made public.
B. Current Value Accounting
As described earlier, independently audited accounting state-
ments can be viewed either as a means of helping shareholders
to spot misbehavior by management or as a means of helping
investors to determine the price of a security. Although it is not
clear that the SEC would describe the dichotomy in this way, its
views on accounting have been consistent with its views on pro-
jections. For most of its history, the agency rejected any depar-
ture from historical cost accounting statements, even if the de-
parture consisted only of a supplemental disclosure of appraised
asset values."2 More recently, the SEC has encouraged the ac-
counting profession's standard-setting body, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board ("FASB"), to take tentative steps to-
ward current value accounting with respect to financial instru-
ments.
This innovation is also a nod toward the accuracy enhance-
ment model. The FASB itself was created because of the SEC's
concern that the accounting profession had not responded with
sufficient vigor to the conglomerate merger boom of the
1960s.' Some commentators argued that these mergers were
motivated in part by the desire to boost stock prices artificially
using accounting gimmickry.2" Both the accounting profession
and the SEC concluded that merger accounting standards were
contributing to market inefficiency and that it was the job of the
profession and the SEC to fix the problem. The FASB set about
to revise merger accounting standards. On a more fundamental
level, its first concept release stated that "[flinancial reporting
should provide information to help present and potential inves-
tors and other users in assessing the amount, timing and uncer-
tainty of prospective cash receipts.""5
' See R.G. Walker, The SEC's Ban on Upward Asset Revaluations and the Disclosure
of Current Values, 28 Abacus 3, 122-24 (1992).
See Loss and Seligman, 2 Securities Regulation at 703-12 (cited in note 78).
See, for example, Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 56-64
(Norton, 1973).
' Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts No. 1 viii (1978) (emphasis added).
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The notion that accounting standards can, and should, con-
tribute significantly to price efficiency is consistent with the- accu-
racy enhancement model. It also calls directly into question the
appropriateness of historical cost accounting."6 The views of
the accounting profession and the SEC therefore seem to be com-
ing into line with the views of critics who have attacked the
SEC's focus on historical cost accounting. It remains to be seen
whether the relatively limited steps already taken toward current
value accounting are the beginning of a fundamental shift.
From the perspective of the agency cost model, historical cost
accounting is entirely adequate. The first and most important
function of accounting statements is to enable shareholders to
determine how the firm's assets are being used. Current value
accounting provides information not only about the firm's actual
transactions, but also about hypothetical transactions-the sale
of corporate assets that are not actually for sale. At the same
time, there is no reason to prohibit disclosure of current values.
To the extent appraisals of assets provide useful information,
there will be investor demand for such appraisals, which manag-
ers will or will not satisfy depending on the cost.
C. Integrated Disclosure and Shelf Registration
The SEC explicitly acknowledged the theory of efficient mar-
kets as a factor in its streamlining of the new-issue and periodic
disclosure systems in the early 1980s."3 7 It noted that for large,
established firms that are followed by analysts, previously-dis-
closed information should already be reflected in price. Accord-
ingly, there should be no need to provide the same disclosures
again in connection with a new issue of stock by such a company.
The SEC's Integrated Disclosure System allows certain compa-
nies that are already subject to SEC periodic reporting require-
ments to file abbreviated new-issue disclosure documents that
"incorporate by reference" the previously-filed periodic disclosure
documents. 8 In addition, companies that have been filing re-
ports for twelve months and that meet certain other require-
ments are eligible for "shelf" registration, under which they may
"' See Kripke, 45 NYU L Rev at 1188-96 (cited in note 226).
See Securities Act Rel No 6383 (Mar 3, 1982), Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 72,328
(Accounting Series Transfer Binder) (adopting integrated disclosure system).
' See, for example, Form S-3, General Instructions, 2 Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) T
7152 (July 7, 1993).
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register an amount of securities to be sold on a periodic basis
without the need for further registration or SEC review.' 9
From an agency cost perspective, these innovations move in
the correct direction. They do not go far enough, however, be-
cause they were made for the wrong reasons. The key character-
istic of "seasoned" companies is not that they are followed by
analysts and priced efficiently, but that they have moved out of
the promotional stage. Accordingly, the range of agency problems
that disclosure can solve is reduced. The remaining problems are
principally executive compensation and self-dealing (and perhaps
underwriters' compensation, although the degree of independence
between managers and underwriters should increase as a new
company ages).
This would suggest that the SEC's current policies are too
restrictive. In particular, the registration process for seasoned
companies should be streamlined even more. A registration state-
ment for an appropriately seasoned company could be made a
mere "notice filing" that would become effective upon filing.2'
Seasoned companies should be able to offer and sell securities at
will using a nonmisleading prospectus that discloses the compen-
sation and financial interests of the underwriters.
D. Executive Compensation
In 1992, the SEC adopted substantial changes to the re-
quired disclosures of executive compensation.24' One important
change was to require more detail with respect to noncash com-
pensation such as stock options and stock appreciation rights. 2
In addition, information is required that implicitly invites from
the shareholders a normative judgment about the amount of
compensation the top executives receive. This latter information
includes a comparison between the issuer's stock performance
and both a market index and an index of peer companies,' as
well as a statement from the compensation committee of the
17 CFR § 230.415(a)(1)(x) (1994).
240 Registration statements filed on Form S-3 that relate to dividend or interest rein-
vestment plans become effective upon filing. See Rule 462, 17 CFR § 230.462 (1994). The
SEC could, if it desired, extend the same treatment to any registration statement filed on
Form S-3.
24 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Rel No 6962 (Oct 16, 1992), Fed
Secur L Rptr (CCH) T 85,056 (1992 Transfer Binder).
2 17 CFR § 229.402(c), (d), (i) (1994).
24 Id § 229.402(1).
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board of directors regarding the factors considered in setting the
CEO's compensation.2
Criticism of the changes has taken two separate approaches.
Some commentators have questioned whether the expanded dis-
closures of noncash compensation provide shareholders with any
relevant information that was not already available to them.2"
Other critics have charged that the new disclosures, particularly
the compensation committee report, inject the SEC impermissibly
into corporate governance.2"
The latter argument is not new; similar challenges were
made to the SEC's campaign against "questionable payments"
(bribes) in the 1970s." From the standpoint of the agency cost
model, criticisms of SEC disclosures on the grounds that they
relate to matters of corporate governance are largely misplaced.
Much of corporate governance has to do with reducing agency
costs, so it is inevitable that mandatory disclosure, having the
same focus, would sometimes encroach on the territory of corpo-
rate law.
At the same time, controversies surrounding the SEC's use of
the disclosure system to police- the governance of publicly traded
companies raise a basic question about the design of securities
regulation. Is securities regulation more properly part of corpo-
rate law (as it was for a long time in England) or a separate
discipline? This is not merely a definitional issue in a federal
system where corporate governance has been traditionally left to
state law. The question became particularly acute when Congress
decided to use mandatory disclosure not only to uncover agency
information regarding promoters, but also to target corporate
managers of publicly traded companies. While one might argue
that the Securities Act dealt with an issue on the margin of cor-
porate law (that is, the promoter problem), the Exchange Act
created federal law at the very core of corporate governance.
I will not delve here into the debate between proponents of
state and federal rules of corporate governance.2" The question
2 Id § 229.402(k).
25 See, for example, Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based
Solution, 34 BC L Rev 937, 956 (1993).
' See Comment, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclo-
sure Rules, 43 Case W Res L Rev 1175, 1185 (1993) (describing critical comments received
during SEC rule-making process).
27 See, for example, Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure at 19-20 (cited in note
4).
= For an excellent treatment, see Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corpo-
rate Law (American Enterprise Institute, 1993).
1110 [62:1047
Mandatory Disclosure
seems less acute, in any event, with respect to mandatory disclo-
sure of a promoter's financial interest. The range of potential
solutions to the promoter problem is not great. Most if not all
Anglo-American jurisdictions that encountered the promoter
problem ultimately arrived at similar solutions-the promoter
had to disclose his financial interest, and in many instances also
had to disclose the precise amount of profit he was making. A
similar uniformity does not exist with respect to the alleviation of
manager/shareholder conflicts, and thus the Exchange Act's dis-
closure requirements coexist less easily with state law than does
the Securities Act.
CONCLUSION
The accuracy enhancement model of mandatory disclosure
explains why a hypothetical disclosure system that required a
firm to provide all value-relevant information simultaneously to
all market participants could be efficient. This Article has argued
that that analysis, important and interesting as it is, has little
relevance to real-world mandatory disclosure systems. The exist-
ing mandatory disclosure system in the United States was not
designed to provide all value-relevant information to all market
participants, and after sixty years it remains rather far from that
goal. Rather, the system was an incremental change from a long-
standing set of judicial doctrines that were designed to combat a
specific agency problem-the promoter problem. The most sub-
stantial innovation in the American mandatory disclosure system
was the use of disclosure after the promotional stage to combat
manager/shareholder agency problems, specifically management
compensation and self-dealing.
The fact that mandatory disclosure began as a means of
controlling agency costs does not mean that it should not be used
to achieve the goal of accuracy enhancement if it can do so cost-
effectively. The hurdles blocking that result, however, seem
dauntingly high. It is far from obvious that the involuntary col-
lectivization of information can succeed where the involuntary
collectivization of other productive assets has so notoriously
failed. Success requires both the suppression of individuals' at-
tempts to circumvent the system and, even more implausibly,
competence bordering on omniscience on the part of the central
authority that decides what information should be produced and
how it should be distributed.
The issue of what mandatory disclosure can efficiently ac-
complish is perhaps more important today than it has been for
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decades. Stock markets are emerging in dozens of countries
around the world, including those countries making the transi-
tion from central planning to a market economy. Policymakers
are struggling to determine what regulatory systems are appro-
priate for fledgling markets. Given extremely scarce resources,
emerging markets would do well to concentrate on the most cost-
effective regulatory steps first. In the field of mandatory disclo-
sure, the most cost-effective step of all is to use a limited amount
of disclosure aimed at promotional companies to combat the very
large and persistent promoter problem. There is undoubtedly
further debate to come on whether any additional steps can pro-
vide benefits in excess of their costs.
